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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 
Money Laundering Policy Implementation Guide 


(U) Money Laundering 
(U) Policy Implementation Guide 



(U) Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(U) Criminal Investigative Division 
0359PG 


(U) December 10, 2010 


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GENERAL INFORMATION: Questions or comments pertaining to this policy 
implementation guide can be directed to: 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBIHQ)/Criminal Division 


Financial Crimes Section, Asset Forfeiture/Money Laundering Unit 


Division Point of Contact: Unit Chie 



(NOTE: This document supersedes The Money Laundering Manual dated 


4/15/2007; EC 27B-HQ-C1158008, Serial: 333 (“Money Laundering Program 
Matters Money Laundering Investigations Use of Cooperating Witnesses”) and EC 
272B-HQ-C1158008, Serial: 357 (“Money Laundering Program Matters Money 


Laundering Investigations - Transactions in Foreign Countries”) 


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PRIVILEGED INFORMATION: 

Any use of this report, including direct quotes or identifiable paraphrasing, will be 
marked with the following statement: 


This document and its contents are the property of the FBI. If the document or its 
contents are provided to an outside agency, it and its contents are not to be distributed 
outside of that agency without the written permission of the FBI. 


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(U) Table of Contents 

1. (U) Scope 1 

2. (U) Roles and Functional Responsibilities 2 

2. 1 . (U) Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section (AFMLS) 2 

2.2. (U) United States Attorneys (USA) 2 

2.3. (U) FBI’s Asset Forfeiture/Money Laundering Unit 3 

2.4. (U) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 3 

2.5. (U) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 4 

3. (U) Policies 5 

3.1. (U) Predicated Investigative Methods and Approval Levels 5 

3.1.1. (U) Traditional or Overt Money Laundering Investigations 5 

3.1.2. (U) Money Laundering Transactions That Involve the Use of an 

Undercover Employee 5 

3. 1 .3. (U) Investigations That Involve the Use of CHSs 6 

3.1.4. (U) Providing FBIHQ Notification 7 

3.1.5. (U) Money Laundering Group I UCO Proposals 7 

3.2. (U) Money Laundering Transactions Involving Terrorist Organizations 9 

3.2.1. (U) Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations List 9 

3.2.2. (U) FBI Policy Regarding Transactions with Terrorist Organizations 9 

3.2.3. (U) Potential Exemptions 10 

. 3.3. (U) Use of Terrorism Classification and Money Laundering Subclassifications.. 1 1 

3.3.1. (U) Terrorism Matters 1 1 

3.3.2. (U) Money Laundering Subclassifications 1 1 

3.3.3. (U) Cross-Program OC, Gangs and Criminal Enterprise Program (G/CEP) 

and Money Laundering Cases Initiation Guidance 1 1 

3.3.4. (U) FBIHQ Program Management of Cross-Program OC, G/CEP, and Money 

Laundering Investigations 13 

3.3.5. (U) Field Office Responsibilities for Reporting Cross-Program Drug/Money 

Laundering Investigations 13 

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3.4. (U) Foreign UCO Transactions and Covert Bank Accounts . 14 

3.4. 1 . (U) Establishing Covert Accounts in a Foreign-Based Financial Institution . 14 

3.4.2. (U) FBI Policy Regarding Extraterritorial Activity 15 

3.5. (U) interagency Coordination of Money Laundering and the Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU) 15 

3.6. (U) Requests Pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) 26 

3.6.1. (U) FinCEN 314(a) Requests 26 

3.6.2. (U) Egmont Requests from Foreign Financial Institutions 27 

4. (U) Procedures and Processes 29 

4.1. (U) Money Laundering: Basic Concepts 29 

4.1.1. (U) Definition 29 

4.1.2. (U) Scope 29 

4.1.3. (U) Overview of Money Laundering Statutes 29 

4.2. (U) The Money Laundering Process 30 

4.3. (U) Money .Laundering Methods 31 

4.3.1. (U) Bulk Smuggling, 31 U.S.C. § 5332 31 

4.3.2. (U) Stored Value Devices 31 

4.3.3. (U) Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) 33 

4.3.4. (U) Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) 34 

4.3.5. (U) Global Financial System 36 

4.3.6. (U) Money Services Businesses 39 

4.3.7. (U) Corporate Laundering Schemes 40 

4.3.8. (U) Digital Currency (E-Currency) 40 

4.4. (U) Money Laundering: Conducting Investigations 41 

4.5. (U) Initiating Money Laundering Predicated Investigations/Transactions 41- 

4.5.1. (U) Traditional or Overt Investigations 41 

4.5.2. (U) Sophisticated and Covert Investigative Methods 41 

4.5.3. (U) Transactions that Involve the Use of a UCE 43 

/ 4.5.4. (U) Investigations/Transactions That Involve the Use of a CHS 44 

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4.6. (U) Requesting Exemption for Money Laundering Transactions with Terrorist 

Organizations 44 

4.7. (U) Submission of 3 14(a) Requests to FinCEN: 44 

4.8. (U) Submission of Egmont Requests to FinCEN 45 

4.9. (U) Traditional Interviews 45 

4.9.1. (U) Non-confrontational 45 

4.9.2. (U) Confrontational 46 

4.10. (U) Subpoenas 46 

4.11. (U) Ex-Parte Orders 46 

4.12. (U) Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and Letters Rogatory 47 

4.1 3. (U) Physical Surveillance 48 

4.14. (U) Records Checks I.... 48 

4.15. (U) Other 48 

4.16. (U) Financial Analysis 48 

4. 1 .6. 1 . (U) Obtaining and Analyzing Financial Records 49 

5. (U) Recordkeeping Requirements 51 

5.1 . (U) Statistical Reporting for All Money Laundering Investigations 51 

6. (U) Summary of Legal Authorities 52 

6. 1 . (U) Primary Money Laundering Statutes 52 

6.2. (U) Related Criminal Statutes 52 

6.3. (U) Companion Forfeiture Statutes 52 

6.4. (U) Federal Regulations 53 

List of Appendices 

(U) Appendix A: Legal Authorities A-l 

(U) Appendix B: FATF Forty Recommendations B-l 

(U//FOUO) Appendix C: Memorandum of Understanding Among the Secretary 
of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Postmaster General Regarding 
Money Laundering Investigations C-l 

(U) Appendix D: Sources of Additional Information D-l 

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(U) Appendix E: Contact Information E-l 

(U) Appendix F: Key Words F-l 

(U) Appendix G: Acronyms G-l 

Table of Figures 

Figure 1. (U) Association-Branded Prepaid Cards 33 

Figure 2. (U) Basic Hawala 34 

Figure 3. (U) Black Market Peso Exchange 36 

Figure 4. (U) Use of the Global Financial System to Launder Money 38 


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1. (U) Scope 

(U) Purpose: This policy implementation guide (PG) provides Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) employees with an understanding of money laundering matters, as 
well as guidance on policies and procedures relating to money laundering investigations. 
This PG ensures that assessments and predicated investigations comply with the Attorney 
General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Investigations (AGG-Dom), dated 
September 29, 2008, and the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 
(DIOG), dated December 16, 2008, or as revised. With knowledge and awareness, the 
FBI can more effectively investigate money laundering. 

(U) Background: The Asset Forfeiture/Money Laundering Unit (AF/MLU), Financial 
Crimes Section (FCS) prepared this PG. The Department of Justice (DOJ) defines money 
laundering as the process by which criminals conceal or disguise the proceeds of their 
crimes or convert those proceeds into goods and services. Concealment, in any form, is 
money laundering. Simply put, money laundering is any knowing use of the proceeds of 
criminal activity. Money laundering occurs whenever crime is principally motivated by 
financial reward. Criminals naturally conceal or disguise their ill-received gains to avoid 
detection. 

(U) In November 2001, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, also 
known as the USA PATRIOT Act (hereafter the Act). The Act included various 
provisions to deter money laundering. These provisions authorized new tools for criminal 
investigators and increased criminal penalties. This PG describes these provisions and 
outlines the procedures needed to effectively investigate money laundering matters. 

(U) Intended Audience: All FBI employees, task force officers (TFO), contract 
employees, and other personnel who conduct money laundering investigations or provide 
financial or intelligence-based case support on such investigations will use this PG as a 
reference. 


(U) Link to Corporate Policy Directive 0359D 


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2. (U) Roles and Functional Responsibilities 

2.1. (U) Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section (AFMLS) 

(U) The Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section (AFMLS) of the DOJ provides 
centralized management for DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Program and directs DOJ’s 
components in prosecuting money laundering investigations. The AFMLS initiates, 
coordinates, and reviews legislative and policy proposals affecting the Asset Forfeiture 
Program and money laundering enforcement agencies. 

(U) The AFMLS oversees asset forfeiture; money laundering training; and conducts 
seminars for federal prosecutors, investigating agents, and law enforcement personnel. It 
also produces legal publications and training materials to enhance its legal support 
functions. The AFMLS Intranet site is available on the DOJ Intranet at 
http ://dojnet. doj .gov/ criminal/afoml/default.htm. 

2.2. (U) United States Attorneys (USA) 

(U) Money laundering cases can be prosecuted by the United States Attorney’s Office 
(USAO) in any district where a financial transaction in furtherance of money laundering 
has taken place. Some money laundering cases are prosecuted directly by the AFMLS. 
Agents who have evidence that a money laundering transaction has occurred must consult 
with a prosecutor to determine if sufficient proof exists to establish all of the elements 
required to support a money laundering charge. In order to do so, the agent will have to 
establish the following: 

1 . (U) The nature of the transaction: Money must go between people, bank accounts, 
etc. 

2. (U) The source of the funds involved in the transaction: There must be proof that 
the money came from a crime that is among the list of money laundering 
predicates, also known as specified unlawful activities (SUA). 

3. (U) The subject’s knowledge: There must be proof, which is often circumstantial, 
that the subject knew the funds were derived from a felony. It is not necessary to 
prove that the subject knew anything about the specific crime that the funds 
actually came from. 

(U) To establish a violation of Title 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section (§) 1956, 
there must be proof that the subject intended to either conceal the funds or promote the 
SUA. To establish a violation of 1 8 U.S.C. § 1957, there must be proof that the subject 
transferred an amount greater than $10,000 by or through a financial institution. These 
charges are not mutually exclusive and can be charged together where the elements of 
both violations are satisfied. 


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(U) A USA must approve an indictment. Typically, the USA’s unit chief overseeing 
money laundering prosecutions can approve a complaint charging money laundering. The 
indictment and the complaint will both serve as charging instruments and either may he 
used as the basis for an arrest warrant on money laundering charges. 

(U) Furthermore, approval of a USA or the DOJ Criminal Division is required for an FBI 
agent or employee to conduct money laundering transactions involving an aggregate 
amount exceeding $1 million, unless it is part of a Group I Undercover Operation (UCO). 
See AGG-Dom, Section V(C) (3)(f). 

2.3. (U) FBI’s Asset Forfeiture/Money Laundering Unit 

(U) The mission of the AF/MLU is to promote the strategic use of asset forfeiture and to 
ensure that field offices employ money laundering statutes in all appropriate investigations. 
The asset forfeiture and money laundering investigative processes identify, target, and 
disrupt individuals and criminal and terrorist organizations engaged in fraud schemes that 
target our Nation's financial infrastructure. The AF/MLU carries out its mission by: 

• (U) Providing support and guidance to field offices on asset forfeiture and money 
laundering matters. 

• (U) Facilitating proactive predicated investigations by consulting on the 
development of money laundering UCOs and by obtaining relevant authorizations. 

• (U) Providing training to FBI personnel on the application of asset forfeiture, 
money laundering and identity theft statutes, money laundering methods, and 
investigative methods. 

• (U) Participating in multi-agency working groups to develop strategic solutions to 
various crime problems. 

• (U) Providing resources, when needed, to support asset identification and 
financial analysis for investigations deemed to have significant forfeiture potential. 

• (U) Developing initiatives aimed at facilitating field investigations and addressing 
crime problems through legislative and regulatory channels. 

(U) Agents in the field are to provide regular updates to the AF/MLU on money 
laundering investigations and prosecutions. This' enables the AF/MLU to detect new 
trends in money laundering so that this information can be collected and disseminated to 
the field through the AF/MLU Intranet site and during training. 


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2.5. (U) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 

(U) The FATF was established at the 1989 G-7 Summit in Paris. The FATF is an 
intergovernmental policy-making body whose purpose is the development and promotion 
of national and international laws and regulations to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing. 

(U) As of October 2009, 34 countries, including the United States, were FATF members. 
Member countries agree to comply with FATF’s "Forty Recommendations" (anti-money 
laundering [AML] measures) and to implement the FATF’s recommendations to combat 
money laundering. The Forty Recommendations address the criminal justice system and 
law enforcement, the financial system and its regulation, and international cooperation. 

(U) In 1996 and 2003, the FATF revised the Forty Recommendations to incorporate 
changes in money laundering trends and to anticipate potential future threats. The FATF 
has also elaborated on various interpretative notes designed to clarify the application of 
specific recommendations and to provide additional guidance (see Appendix B of this PG 
for a complete list of the Forty Recommendations). 

(U) In December 2009, the FATF met in Washington, D.C., to discuss potential revisions 
to the Forty Recommendations. Proposals geared towards increased international 
cooperation were recommended and formal drafts of these proposals will be submitted at 
future FATF meetings. 


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3. (U) Policies 

3.1. (U) Predicated Investigative Methods and Approval Levels 

(U) The intricacies of predicated money laundering investigations, along with their 
possible international impact and potential for sensitive issues, necessitate different levels 
of review and approval, depending upon the type of investigative methods contemplated. 
These investigative methods can be broken down into three primary categories: 

(1) traditional/overt investigations, (2) money laundering transactions that involve the use 
of an undercover employee (UCE), and (3) money laundering transactions that involve 
the use of confidential human sources (CHS). 

3.1.1. (U) Traditional or Overt Money Laundering Investigations 

(U) Traditional or overt money laundering (predicated) investigations address criminal 
activity and the laundering of the proceeds of that activity. These traditional, overt 
investigations have proven to be very successful, particularly in white collar crime (WCC) 
cases where a group or an individual engages in some SUA and launders the proceeds of 
that activity. A traditional investigation may not use the undercover method to conduct 
transactions. I I 


3.1.2. (U) Money Laundering Transactions That Involve the Use of an 

Undercover Employee 

(U) Money laundering by an undercover FBI employee, or an employee of another 
federal, state, or local law enforcement agency acting at the direction of the FBI, is a 
"sensitive circumstance" under the Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover 
Operations (AGG-UCO) when the aggregate amount of money laundering exceeds $1 
million dollars, regardless of how many separate instances of money laundering occur. 
See Attorney General (AG) Order No. 2955-2008, Section 4 (03/05/2008). 

(U) The Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) or Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of a 
field office can approve an undercover operation in which the UCE or CHS conducts 
money laundering transactions and the aggregate amount does not exceed $1 million 
dollars. See the Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive Operations (FGUSO). 

(U) Under AG Order No. 2955-2008, money laundering by a UCE in a series of more 
than five undercover activities constitutes a UCO. If the aggregate amount laundered 
does not exceed $1 million dollars, the operation may be approved by an SAC as a Group 
II UCO. An undercover contact by a UCE includes any meetings, contacts, or 
conversations that could be considered evidentiary, whether conducted by oral, written, 
wire, or electronic means. Chance meetings or casual contacts are not generally 

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considered evidentiary, but could become evidentiary if there were repeated meetings or 
unplanned discussions. 

(U) When the aggregate laundering of money exceeds $1 million, the activity is sensitive, 
and requires Group I UCO designation and approval from the Criminal Undercover 
Operations Review Committee (CUORC) and the Assistant Director (AD), Criminal 
Investigative Division (CID). The $ 1 million dollar cap applies to the case, not to each 
subject of the investigation. 

(U) These rules apply regardless of whether the UCE is injecting government funds into a 
criminal money laundering operation or the UCE is laundering illicit funds for the 
subjects of the investigation. 

(U) When any money laundering UCO receives a Group I UCO designation and has been 
approved by the AD of CID, individual transactions may be approved by the SAC up to 
the maximum cap approved by the AD, CID. 


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does not exceed $1 million dollars. See AGG-Dom, Section V(C)(3)(f), CHSPM. Section 
10.2. Furthermore, delegation of SAC authority may be made to an Assistant Special 
Agent in Charge (ASAC), pursuant to the DIOG (“Supervisory Roles and 
Responsibilities”). In addition to the approvals stated in 3.1.2, use of a CHS to engage in 
money laundering transactions over $1 million dollars requires approval from a United 
States Attorney or the DOJ Criminal Division. 

(U) Operational FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) unit involvement is necessary to coordinate 
individual investigations worldwide and eliminate any possibility that the FBI and/or 
other federal law enforcement agencies are unwittingly laundering money for one another. 
Accordingly, notification of planned money laundering activity by a CHS must be 
provided to the AF/MLU as soon as practicable. It must be noted that FBIHQ 
concurrence does not eliminate the need for the SAC to personally authorize the CHS’s 
engagement in otherwise illegal activity (e.g., money laundering). 

(U) NOTE: A money laundering investigation using a CHS instead of a UCE to facilitate 
ithe money laundering transactions, will, as a matter of FBI policy, be treated the same as 
if it were a Group I UCO if the amount being laundered exceeds $1 million. As a result, 
the CUORC process will be required in such cases. 


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3.1.4. (U) Providing FBIHQ Notification 

(U) Field offices must advise AF/MLU and any other appropriate FBIHQ operational unit 
prior to, or as soon as practicable after, engaging in money laundering transactions 
outside of a Group I or Group II UCO. This applies to transactions involving either CHSs 
or UCEs. This may he done telephonically by the case agent, but must be followed by an 
electronic communication (EC) so that the information can be uploaded and indexed. The 
following issues must be addressed in the EC: 

• (U) The background and objectives of the investigation. 

• (U) The details of the proposed transaction(s), amount to be laundered, identity of 
the subjects, bank accounts to be used (if known), and the number and total 
amount of all previously approved transactions. 

• (U) If the money is to be invested, how it will be segregated to avoid the 
commingling of funds and potential harm to third parties. 

• (U) The prosecutive opinion of the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), if 
applicable. 

• (U) The concurrence of the SAC, which may be delegated in writing to the AS AC. 

3.1.5. (U) Money Laundering Group I UCO Proposals 

(U) Money laundering Group I UCO proposals must be submitted to the operational 
section at FBIHQ that has program responsibility for the underlying criminal activity. For 
example, a money laundering Group I UCO proposal where the proceeds to be laundered 
are derived from a bank fraud must be submitted to the appropriate operational desk; a 
Colombian drug money laundering Group I UCO proposal must be submitted to die 
Organized Crime (OC)/Drug Section. The UCO proposal must follow the guidelines 
established in the FGUSO, the AGG-UCO, and die DIOG. In addition, money laundering 
UCO proposals must include a detailed explanation of the proposed money laundering 
methods, such as the use of any domestic or foreign business, bank account, or financial 
institution. If it is anticipated that the UCO will involve international activity, the need 
for cooperation of foreign law enforcement, or the involvement of foreign government 
officials, the comments of the appropriate legal attachd (Legat), and IOD must be 
solicited before the UCO proposal is submitted to the CUORC. The use of investments in 
the money laundering process, and how the funds are to be segregated to avoid 
commingling and potential harm to innocent third parties, must be sufficiently explained. 

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(U) It is the responsibility of the field office to monitor the amount of funds laundered. 
Once the cap is reached, all money laundering activity must cease, pending review by 
FBIHQ. Field offices are expected to anticipate the need for FBIHQ authority to exceed 
the cap. In these instances, a supplementary EC requesting authority to raise the cap must 
be submitted to the operational section at FBIHQ, with one copy to the Undercover and 
Sensitive Operations Unit (USOU). Field offices must anticipate at least 30 days for 
requests to be reviewed by the CUORC and approved by the AD, CID. An EC requesting 
authority must include the following information: 

1 . (U) An update and summary of the investigation conducted since the initial Group 
I UCO presentation. 

2. (U) Any accomplishments or progress made in achieving the objectives stated in 
the initial Group I UCO proposal. 

3. (U) An explanation of the proposed money laundering activity if it differs from 
the initial proposal. 

4. (U) The necessity for continued money laundering activity (e.g., anticipated 
accomplishments or specific objectives for the proposed activity). 

5. (U) The legal opinion of the USA. 

6. (U) The concurrence of the SAC. 

(U) Requests for renewal of UCO authority (additional six-month authority) must 
continue to be submitted pursuant to the FGUSO. 

(U) Once a Group I UCO has been reviewed by the CUORC and approved by the AD, 
CID, individual money laundering transactions within the established cap may be 
approved by the SSA. A change in the focus of a UCO or a major change in the proposed 
money laundering activity requires that a supplementary proposal be submitted to the 
CUORC and approved by the AD, CID. 

3. 1.5.1. (U) Additional Reporting Requirements 

(U) Proper coordination of individual money laundering investigations is necessary to 
eliminate any possibility that agencies are unwittingly laundering money for themselves 
or each other. Therefore, field offices must notify FBIHQ by EC after each money 
laundering transaction where government agents, or persons operating at their direction, 
launder funds derived from unlawful activity or launder government funds pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3). Notification must be made as soon as possible, but no later than 
15 calendar days after the transaction. The brief EC must include the time, date, and 
location of the money laundering, as well as the amount laundered. The EC must be sent 
to the operational CID unit responsible for the violation and the AF/MLU, CID. If the 
case agent is not certain that the EC will reach the AF/MLU within 15 calendar days, a 
summary e-mail must be sent in advance of the EC. 

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3.2. (U) Money Laundering Transactions Involving Terrorist Organizations 

(U) Even the smallest amount of money in the hands of an international or domestic 
terrorist organization could have devastating consequences. The FBI must ensure that it 
does not support the terrorist organizations that the United States and its allies are 
attempting to dismantle. 

3.2.1. (U) Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations List 

(U) Since 1 997, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) has maintained the list of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (FTO) which identifies FTOs that have demonstrated a capability 
and/or willingness to engage in terrorist methods to threaten U.S. national security 
interests. These methods include attacks on U.S. nationals; American national defense; 
and military, diplomatic, and economic interests. The fact that an organization is 
designated on the FTO list provides the legal authority to investigate and prosecute U.S. 
citizens or foreign nationals within the United States for financially, ideologically, or 
logistically aiding any designated FTO. Certain members or representatives of an FTO on 
the list can be denied entry to the United States through visa rejection or other means. 
Pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13244, the United States can compel U.S. financial 
institutions to freeze any assets linked to an FTO and report them to the United States 
D epartment of the Treasury (PQTO. 

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3.2.2. (U) FBI Policy Regarding Transactions with Terrorist Organizations 


(U) Absent an exemption, this PG prohibits money laundering transactions of any type 
between a UCE or government CHS and any individual or group engaged in international 
or domestic terrorism and/or any organization designated by the United States 
Government (USG) or its allies as an FTO, where the funds laundered are to be delivered 
to the individual or group. 


(U) Absent an exemption, this PG prohibits transactions involving a country designated 
by the USG as a "state sponsor of terrorism." 

(U) Absent an exemption, this PG prohibits transactions involving individuals and groups 
engaged in international and/or domestic terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331. 


(U) This general prohibition does not apply to money laundering stings or other 
operations where the funds are recovered by the FBI at the time of delivery or within a 
specified short time. 

if 

(U) Transfers of material goodq are not covered by 

this policy. Responsibility for overall compliance with the aforementioned policy rests 
with the requesting field office. Close coordination with FBIHQ is necessary to make 
sure that this policy is not violated. The policy applies to facilitation cases, 


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3.2.2.I. (U) Facilitation 

(U) Facilitation, when used in the context of money laundering, indicates assistance 

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or criminal groups are often criticized for facilitating the criminal activity. The degree to 
which agents facilitate criminal activity must be strongly considered by individual SSAs 
when the FBI engages in money laundering for an individual or a criminal enterprise. 

Consequently, the specific goals and objectives of the overall investigation must 
incorporate a plan for these money laundering transactions. SSAs must evaluate the 
investigative benefits obtained (e.g., probable cause for Title III or search warrant) from 


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3.2.3. (U) Potential Exemptions 

(U) This policy anticipates some instances where conducting a money laundering 
transaction with a terrorist organization, designated or not, could be allowed. The 
cost/benefit analysis must be articulated to the highest levels of FBIHQ. A field office 
must conduct a risk assessment to include estimated risks to U.S. citizens and other third 
parties. In addition, the field office must detail the investigative need for the transaction 
and the reasons why other investigative measures are insufficient. The office must also 
have authority for the UCE or CHS to engage in the money laundering, material support, 
conspiracy, structuring, bulk cash smuggling, and any other offenses relevant to the 
operation. The only way such an investigation can be authorized is with the approval of 
the Director and the Assistant Attorney General for National Security: See AGG-Dom, 
Section V(C)(3). 

(U) If the proposed money laundering transaction involves funds of a designated terrorist 
organization (DTO) rather than FBI funds, and the Department of the Treasury, Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OF AC) has issued an order to financial institutions to block 
financial transactions involving such assets pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1189, then: (1) OF AC 
must concur with the money laundering transaction, and/or (2) the Attorney General must 
authorize the illegal activity in violation of the OF AC order, and (3) the Director or his 
designee must personally approve the transaction. 

(U) In order to request an exception/exemption, the field office must submit an EC to the 
appropriate operational unit at FBIHQ, the AF/MLU, and the Terrorist Financing 

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provided by the FBI or other law enforcement officials to an individual or criminal 
enterprise in support of some underlying criminal activity . 


JCEs who launder the funds generated by individuals 


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Operations Section (TFOS). The operational unit drafts the appropriate approval 
communications for signature by the Director or his designee. 

3.3. (U) Use of Terrorism Classification and Money Laundering 

Subclassifications 

3.3.1. (U) Terrorism Matters 

(U) If a field division opens a criminal investigation with subjects havi ng po ssible or 
confirmed ties to terrorism, the investigation must be opened under the nvestigative 
classification. Informational copies of the communications that relate to money 
laundering must be provided to the AF/MLU by the case agent simultaneously, with the 
case opening. 

3.3.2. (U) Money Laundering Subclassifications 

(U) FBIHQ has noted a substantial increase in the number of money laundering 
investigations that target criminal enterprises whose principal activity is laundering the 
illicit proceeds of specified unlawful activities. Money laundering investigations may be 
opened under the 272 classification. In order to accurately reflect the underlying nature of 
investigations within the 272 classification, the following subclassifications have been 
established: 

• (U) 272A - Money Laundering - Organized Crime 

• (U) 272B - Money Laundering - White Collar Crime Matters 

• (U) 272C - Money Laundering - Violent Crimes Major Offenders (VCMO) Matters 

• (U) 272D - Money Laundering - Unknown Specified Unlawful Activity (USUA) 

• (U) 272E - Money Laundering - Targeting Industries or Facilities 

• (U) 272F - Money Laundering - Drugs 

3.3.3. (XT) Cross-Program OC, Gangs and Criminal Enterprise Program (G/CEP) 
and Money Laundering Cases Initiation Guidance 

(U) Prior to the initiation of any organized crime or drug investigation that involves 
potential money laundering charges, field office OC, drug, and/or money laundering 
SSAs must review the circumstances of the planned investigation to determine its focus 
and apply the following criteria: 

• (U) If the target of the investigation is a drug trafficking organization linked to the 
Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT) list or other identified 
significant drug trafficking organization, and the objective of the investigation is to 
dismantle the drug trafficking organization. The investigation must then be initiated 
under the 281/245 (B, C, F, or I) classification, even though money laundering 
methods are being used to target and dismantle the organization. 

11 

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(U) If the target of the investigation is an organized criminal enterprise linked to the 
OC threat list or another identified significant organized criminal enterprise, and 
the objective of the investigation is to dismantle the organized criminal enterprise, 
then the investigation must be initiated under the appropriate OC classification 
even though money laundering techniques are being used to target and dismantle 
the organization. 

(U) If the target of the investigation is a money laundering industry and/or facility 
and the objective is to disrupt and dismantle the money laundering entity, the 
investigation must be initiated under the appropriate 272 classification. 

(U) If a dmg nexus to the investigation exists (e.g., drug traffickers of unknown 
significance using the industry/facility to launder drug proceeds), the investigation 
may appropriately be opened under the 272F classification. 


12 

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3.3.4. (U) FBIHQ Program Management of Cross-Program OC, G/CEP, and 
Money Laundering Investigations 

(U) Program management responsibility for 272A and 272F money laundering 
investigations remains with the AF/MLU, Financial Crimes Section, CED. However, in 
order to maximize the use of the enterprise theory of investigating these violations, it is 
required that 272A and 272F investigations meet the criteria established for OC and 
G/CEP investigations, respectively. See the DIOG for enterprise investigation case 
initiation criteria. Additionally, OC-related or C/CEP investigations may have added 
reporting or notification requirements. Therefore, their respective PGs or policy guidance 
must be consulted prior to initiating a 272A or 272F. 

(U) When the AF/MLU receives an opening communication for a 272A or 272F matter, 
it solicits the concurrence of the appropriate OC or Drug Section operational unit to 
ensure the investigation is an appropriate use of OC or Drug Program resources. The 
AF/MLU also ensures the investigation meets the appropriate OC or drug case initiation 
criteria. The AF/MLU coordinates with the appropriate OC or drug operational units 
regarding significant developments during the investigation and ensures that copies of all 
case communications are provided. 

(U) When OC or Drug Program operational units receive an opening communication for 
an OC or drug matter that has a money laundering component, they review the opening 
communication to ensure the matter is properly classified and then notify the AF/MLU 
that an investigation using money laundering techniques has been opened. The OC and 
drug operational units coordinate with the AF/MLU regarding significant developments 
such as arrests, indictments, convictions, or searches and seizures during the course of the 
investigation and ensure that copies of all case communications are provided to AF/MLU. 

3.3.5. (U) Field Office Responsibilities for Reporting Cross-Program 
Drug/Money Laundering Investigations 

(U) Organized crime, drug, and money laundering program supervisors must ensure that 
all communications to FBIHQ related to these cross-program investigations are addressed 
to both the appropriate G/CEP unit and the AF/MLU. 

(U) Accordingly, field offices are required to address copies of all future 272A and 272F 
communications to the appropriate OC and G/CEP units. Field offices must also forward 
copies of all organized crime and drug matter communications to the AF/MLU when the 
investigations entail a money laundering component. 

(U) Moreover, case agents will coordinate the money laundering components of 
organized crime and drug investigations with the Special Operations Division (SOD). 

SOD provides useful database searches and ensures that all such investigations are 
coordinated with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the U.S. Bureau of 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

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(U) If a matter is opened under the 272 classification and the target of the investigation is 
a public figure, or if any other sensitive investigative matter (SIM) is involved, the rules 
and reporting requirements set forth in the DIOG, Section 10 will apply. 

(U) The program management responsibility for the FBI’s Money Laundering Program 
remains within the AF/MLU, FCS, CUD. 


3.4. (U) Foreign UCO Transactions and Covert Bank Accounts 

3.4.1. (U) Establishing Covert Accounts in a Foreign-Based Financial Institution 



14 . 

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3.4.2. (U) FBI Policy Regarding Extraterritorial Activity 


3.5. (U) Interagency Coordination of Money Laundering and the Memorandum 

of Understanding (MOU) 

(U) The DOJ, the DOT, and the United States Postal Service (USPS) have entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding that delineates the responsibilities for the various 
agencies for enforcing the money laundering statutes. This MOU, which is set forth 
in Appendix C of this PG, became effective on August 16, 1990. Under the MOU, the 
FBI maintains its existing broad jurisdiction in money laundering issues, domestically 
and internationally. The MOU does not restrict the FBI's money laundering investigative 
efforts, and it does not require the FBI to turn over any money laundering investigation to 
another federal, state, or local law enforcement agency, either domestically or 
internationally. The MOU sets forth the jurisdiction, notice, coordination, and other 
requirements for the involved agencies that have responsibilities for investigating 
violations of Title 18, namely, the FBI, DEA, ICE, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
United States Secret Service (USSS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and the USPS. The FBI has 
investigatory jurisdiction, in general, over SUAs relating to its existing jurisdiction (e.g., 
drugs, terrorism, WCC, violent crimes, and foreign counterintelligence). 

(U) The investigatory jurisdiction of the FBI, DEA, ICE, USSS, ATF, and the USPS is 
determined by the specific SUAs involved. A list of these SUAs is set forth below 
followed by the abbreviated name of the agency or agencies having money laundering 
jurisdiction for that SUA: 

• (U) An offense against a foreign nation involving the manufacture, importation, 
sale, or distribution of a controlled substance, where at least one financial 
transaction, or part of a financial transaction, takes place in the United States (FBI, 
DEA). 

• (U) Any act or acts constituting a continuing criminal enterprise (21 U.S.C. § 848) 
(FBI, DEA, USPS). 

• (U) An offense under the following:^ 


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Citation 

SU A/Offense 

Investigatory Jurisdiction 

15U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2; 
78dd-3 

Relating to bribery of foreign 
officials (Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act). 

FBI 

• 

18U.S.C. § 152 

Relating to concealment of 
assets; false oaths and claims; 
and bribery. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. §215 

Relating to commissions or 
gifts for procuring loans. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. §§ 500 -503 

Relating to certain 
counterfeiting offenses. 

USSS, USPS* 

*The jurisdiction of USPS under 
this SUA involves counterfeiting 
of money orders, postcards, indicia 
of postage, and postmarking 
stamps. 

18U.S.C. §513 

Relating to securities of states 
and private entities. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. §542 

Relating to entry of goods by 
means of false statements. 

ICE 

18U.S.C. §545 

Relating to smuggling goods 
into the United States. 

ICE 

18U.S.C. § 549 

Relating to removing goods 
fronvICE custody. 

ICE 

18U.S.C. §641 

Relating to public money, 
property, or records. 

FBI, USPS 

18U.S.C. §656 

Relating to theft, 
embezzlement, or 
misapplication by a bank 
officer or employee. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. §657 

Relating to lending, credit, and 
insurance institutions. 

FBI, USSS*. 

*The jurisdiction of USSS under 



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Citation 

SUA/Offense 

Investigatory Jurisdiction 



this SUA involves theft, 
embezzlement, or misapplication 
by employees of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). 

18U.S.C. §658 

Relating to property mortgaged 
or pledged to farm credit 
agencies. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 666 

Relating to theft or bribery 
concerning programs receiving 
federal funds. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. §§ 793,794, or 
798 

Relating to espionage. 

FBI 

18.U.S.C. § 875 

Relating to interstate 
communications. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1005 

Relating to bank fraud and 
embezzlement. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1006 

Relating to fraudulent credit 
institution entries. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1007 

Relating to bank fraud and 
embezzlement. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1014 

Relating to fraudulent loan or 
credit applications. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1032 

Relating to concealment of 
assets from a financial 
institution. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1201 

Relating to kidnapping. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1203 

Relating to hostage taking. 

FBI 


17 

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Citation 

SUA/Offense 

Investigatory Jurisdiction 

18U.S.C. § 1341 

Relating to frauds and 
swindles against financial 
institutions involving mail. 

FBI 

18U.S.C.§ 1343 

Relating to wire fraud 
affecting a financial institution. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1344 

Relating to financial institution 
fraud. . 

FBI 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2113 or 
2114 

Relating to bank and postal 
robbery and theft. 

FBI, USPS 

FBI and USPS share money 
laundering jurisdiction regarding 
the Section 21 14 - SUA. 

18 U.S.C. §§2251, 
2251 A, 2252, and 2258 

Relating to sexual exploitation 
of children. 

FBI, ICE* 

*The jurisdiction of ICE under this 
SUA involves the importation or 
exportation of material involving 
the sexual exploitation of children. 

18 U.S.C. §2319 

Relating to copyright 
infringement. 

FBI 

18 U.S.C. § 2320 

Relating to trafficking in 
counterfeit goods or services. 

FBI 

19 U.S.C. § 1590 

Relating to aviation 
smuggling. 

ICE 

21 U.S.C. § 830 

Relating to precursor and 
essential chemicals. 

FBI, DEA 

21 U.S.C. § 863 

Relating to transportation of 
drug paraphernalia. 

FBI, DEA, ICE*, USPS 
*The jurisdiction of ICE under this 
SUA involves the illegal 
importation or exportation of drug 
paraphernalia. 

22 U.S.C. § 61 1 et seq. 

Relating to the registration of 

United States Attorney General 


UN CLASSIFEED//FOU O 


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Citation SUA/Offense Investigatory Jurisdiction 

foreign officials (Foreign (USAG) 

Agents Registration Act). 

Section 15 of the Food Relating to Food Stamp Fraud FBI 

Stamp Act of 1 977 involving a quantity of 

(Public Law [P.L.] coupons having a value of not 

95-113) less than $5,000. 

Section 38(c) of the Relating to criminal violations. ICE*, ATF** 

Arms Export Control Act *The jurisdiction of ICE under this 

(22 U.S.C. § 2778) SUA involves exportation, in 

transit, temporary import, or 
temporary export transactions. 
**TTie jurisdiction of ATF under 
this SUA involves the importation 
of items on the U.S. Munitions 
Import List, except those relating 
to exportation, in transit, 
temporary import, or temporary 
export transactions. 


50 U.S.C. App.§ 2410 

Relating to violations of the 
Export Administration Act of 
1979. 

ICE 

50 U.S.C. § 1705 

Relating to penalties of the 
International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act. 

ICE 

50 U.S.C. App. § 16 

Relating to offenses and 
punishment of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act. 

ICE 

33 U.S.C. § 1251 etseq. 

Felony offenses relating to the 
discharge of pollutants into the 
Nation's waters. 

FBI, EPA 

33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. 

Felony offenses relating to the 
dumping of materials into 
ocean waters. 

FBI, EPA 

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Citation 

SUA/Offense 

Investigatory Jurisdiction 

33 U.S.C. § 1901 et.seq. 

Felony offenses relating to the 
discharge of pollutants from 
ships. 

FBI, EPA 

42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. 

Felony offenses relating to the 
safety of public water systems. 

FBI, EPA 

42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. 

Felony offenses relating to 
resource conservation and 
recovery. 

FBI, EPA 


(U) Any act or activity constituting one of the predicate offenses to the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)). These offenses 
are as follows: 

• (U) Offense 1: Any act or threat involving: 


SUA/Offense 

Investigatory Jurisdiction 

Murder 

FBI 

Kidnapping 

FBI 

Gambling 

FBI 

Arson 

FBI, ATF 

Robbery 

FBI 

Bribery 

FBI 

Extortion 

FBI . 

Dealing in obscene matter 

FBI 

Dealing in a controlled substance or listed 
chemical, which is chargeable as a state felony. 

FBI, DEA, USPS 


• (U) Offense 2: Any act which is indictable under any of the following: 

20 


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Citation 

SUA/Offense 

Investigatory 

Jurisdiction 

18U.S.C. §201 

Relating to bribery. 

FBI, USPS 

18U.S.C. §224 

Relating to sports bribery. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. §§471,472, 
and 473 

Relating to counterfeiting. 

usss 

18U.S.C. §659 

Relating to theft from an 
interstate shipment. 

If the act indictable 
under § 659 is felonious, 
FBI and ICE*. 

*The jurisdiction of ICE 
under this SUA involves 
theft from foreign 
shipment. 

18U.S.C. §664 

Relating to embezzlement 
from pension and welfare 
funds. 

FBI 

18 U.S.C.§§ 891-894 

Relating to extortionate credit 
transactions. 

FBI 

18 U.S.C. § 1028 

Relating to fraud and related 
activity in connection with 
identification documents. 

If the act indictable 
under §1028 was 
committed for the 
purpose of financial 
gain, FBI and USSS. 

18U.S.C. § 1029 

! 

Relating to fraud and related 
activity in connection with 
access devices. 

FBI, USSS, USPS 

18 U.S.C. § 1084 

Relating to the transmission 
of gambling information. 

FBI 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 




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Citation SUA/Offense Investigatory 

Jurisdiction 

laundering jurisdiction 
with the FBI when the 
primary focus of the 
offense is mail fraud. 


18U.S.C. § 1344 

Relating to financial 
institution fraud. 

FBI 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1425-1427 

Relating to immigration 
fraud. 

ICE, FBI 

18U.S.C. §§ 1461-1465 

Relating to obscene matter. 

FBI, ICE*, USPS** 
*The jurisdiction of ICE 
under this SUA involves 
§§ 1461-63 and 1465 
relating to illegal 
importation or 

18U.S.C. §§ 1461-1465 

Relating to obscene matter. 

exportation of obscene 
matter. 

**The jurisdiction of 
USPS under this SUA 
involves §§1461 and 
1463 regarding mailing 
of obscene matter. 

18U.S.C. § 1503 

Relating to obstruction of 
justice. 

FBI, USPS 

18U.S.C. § 1510 

Relating to obstruction of 
criminal investigations. 

FBI, USPS 

18U.S.C. § 1511 

Relating to the obstruction of 
state or local law 
enforcement. 

FBI, USPS 

18U.S.C. § 1512 

Relating to tampering with a 
witness, victim, or an 
informant. 

FBI, USPS 


22 


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Citation 

SUA/Offense 

Investigatory 

Jurisdiction 

18U.S.C. § 1513 

Relating to retaliating against 
a witness, victim, or an 
informant. 

FBI, USPS 

18U.S.C. § 1542 

Relating to false statements in 
the application and use of a 
passport. 

FBI - If the act 
indictable under § 1 542 
was committed for the 
purpose of financial 
gain. 

18U.S.C. § 1543 

Relating to forgery or the 
false use of a passport. 

FBI - If the act 
indictable under § 1543 
was committed for the 
purpose of financial 
gain. 

18U.S.C. § 1544 

Relating to misuse of a 
passport. 

FBI - If the act 
indictable under § 1544 
was committed for the 
purpose of financial 
gain. 

18U.S.C. § 1546 

Relating to fraud and misuse 
of visas, permits, and other 
documents. 

FBI - If the act 
indictable under § 1546 
was committed for the 
purpose of financial 
gain. 

18U.S.C. §§ 1581-1588 

Relating to peonage, 
servitude, and slavery. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1951 

Relating to interference with 
commerce, robbery, or 
extortion. 

FBI 

18U.S.C. § 1952 

Relating to racketeering. 

FBI, ATF*, USPS** 
*The jurisdiction of 
ATF under this SUA 
involves traveling in 


23 


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Citation SUAVOffense Investigatory 

Jurisdiction 

interstate commerce 
with respect to arson 
and to liquor on which 
federal excise tax has 
not been paid. **The 
jurisdiction of USPS 
under this SUA involves 
mailing in aid of 
racketeering enterprises. 

18 U.S.C. § 1953 Relating to interstate FBI 

transportation of wagering 
paraphernalia. 

18 U.S.C. § 1954 Relating to unlawful welfare FBI 

fund payments. 

18 U.S.C. § 1955 Relating to the prohibition of FBI 

illegal gambling business. 

18 U.S.C. § 1956 Relating to laundering of FBI 

monetary instruments. 

18 U.S.C. § 1957 Relating to engaging in FBI 

monetary transactions in 
property derived from SUA. 

18 U.S.C. § 1958 Relating to use of interstate FBI 

commerce facilities in the 
commission of murder-for- 
hire, 

18 U.S.C. §§2251, Relating to sexual FBI, ICE* 

2251 A, 2252, and 2260 exploitation of children. *The jurisdiction of ICE 

under this SUA involves 
the importation or 
exportation of material 
involving the sexual 
exploitation of children. 

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Citation 

SUA/Offense 

Investigatory 

Jurisdiction 

18U.S.C. §§2312 and 
2313 

Relating to interstate 
transportation of stolen motor 
vehicles. 

FBI 

18 U.S.C. § 2314 and 
2315 

Relating to interstate 
transportation of stolen 
property. 

FBI,. ICE* 

*The jurisdiction of ICE 
under this SUA involves 
foreign transportation of 
stolen property. 

18 U.S.C. §§2318-2320 

Relating to copyright 
infringement and counterfeit 
goods. 

FBI 

18 U.S.C. §2321 

Relating to trafficking in 
certain motor vehicles or 
vehicle parts. 

FBI, ICE* 

*The jurisdiction of ICE 
under this SUA involves 
importation or 
exportation of certain 
motor vehicles or 
vehicle parts. 

18 U.S.C. §§2341-2346 

Relating to trafficking in 
contraband cigarettes. 

ATF 

18 U.S.C. §§2421-2424 

Relating to white slave 

i traffic. 

1 

FBI 


• (U) Offense 3: Any act which is indictable under: 


Citation SUA/Offense Investigatory 

Jurisdiction 

29U.S.C. §186 Dealing with restrictions on FBI 

payments and loans to labor 
organizations. 

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29 U.S.C. § 501(c) 

Relating to embezzlement 

FBI 


from union funds. 



• (U) Offense 4: Any offense involving fraud connected with a case under Title 1 1 , 
fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, 
concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed 
chemical (as defined in Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), punishable 
under any law of the United States (FBI). 

• (U) Offense 5: Any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign 
Transactions Act. 

• (U) Offense 6: Any act which is indictable under the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act, Section 274 (relating to bringing in or harboring certain aliens); Section 277 
(relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter the United States); or Section 278 
(relating to importation of alien for immoral purpose) if the act indictable under such 
section of the Immigration and Naturalization Act was committed for the purpose of 
financial gain. 


• (U) Offense 7: Any act that is indictable under any provision listed in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2332b (g)(5)(B). 



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(U) The Egmont Group is an international network of over 100 countries that have 
implemented national centers to collect information on suspicious or unusual financial 
activity from the financial industry, analyze the data, and make it available to appropriate 
national authorities for use in combating money laundering, terrorist funding, and other 
financial crimes. The representing authority of each country is kn own as a Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU). In the United States and Egmont is the 

representative. 

(U) The exchange of information is central to the Egmont Group. The two documents 
“Principals for Information Exchange” (June 2001) and “Best Practices for the Exchange 
of Information” (updated June 2004) have been adopted to enhance information exchange 
and to provide guidelines in terms of best practices for the exchange of information 
between FIUs. 

(U) The principles provide, in part, that FIUs should be able to exchange information 
freely with other FIUs based on reciprocity or mutual agreement and consistent with 
procedures understood by the requested and requesting persons. Furthermore, the Egmont 
members have agreed that information exchanged between FIUs may be used only for the 
purpose for which the information was sought or provided. The requesting FIU may not 
transfer information shared by a disclosing FIU to a third party, nor make use of the 
information in' an administrative, investigative, prosecutorial, or judicial purpose without 
the prior consent of the FIU that disclosed the information. 

(U) The Egmont Group members have agreed that all information exchanged by FIUs 
must be subject to strict controls and safeguards to ensure that it is used only in an 
authorized manner, consistent with national provisions on privacy and data protection. 

(U) Money laundering and terrorist financing are international issues that can only be 
effectively addressed through international cooperation and coordination, to which the 
Egmont Group is firmly committed. 

(U) At a minimum, each FIU collects information from Suspicious Activity Reports 

(SARj from its financial institutions. Other sources of information the FIU maintains (or fo 7 fc 

to which it has access) may vary. 

(U) Details regarding the submission of Egmont requests can be found on the 
CID, | | 

(U) It must be noted that information obtained through the Egmont Group will be used 
for lead value only. The records received cannot be used as evidence in any court or 
grand jury proceeding. If records are needed later in these more official settings, copies 

27 


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must be requested through formal channels such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
(MLAT) or Letters Rogatory. 


28 

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4. (U) Procedures and Processes 

4.1. (U) Money Laundering: Basic Concepts 

4.1.1. (U) Definition 

(U) Money laundering is defined by DOJ as the process by which criminals conceal or 
disguise the proceeds of their crimes or convert those proceeds into goods and services. It 
allows criminals to infuse their illegal money into the stream of commerce, thus corrupting 
financial institutions and the money supply, and giving criminals unwarranted economic 
power. While many definitions for money laundering exist, it can be thought of more simply 
as any knowing use of the proceeds of criminal activity. 

4.1.2. (U) Scope 

(U) Money laundering is usually associated with any criminal act in which illicit funds are 
derived. This includes, but is not limited to, bank fraud, insurance fraud, mortgage fraud, 
health care fraud, securities/commodities frauds, advanced fee schemes, high yield and 
prime bank note schemes, Ponzi schemes, government fraud, corporate and occupational 
frauds, cyber crimes, public corruption, drugs, organized crime, and the financing of 
terrorism. Money laundering differs from other types of criminal acts in that it is not a 
stand-alone crime. The laundering of funds is typically a secondary criminal act that only 
has meaning in the context of another underlying crime. Without proceeds from an 
underlying crime, there can be no money laundering. 

(U) There is one exception to this rule. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(2)(A), otherwise known 
as the International Transfer Provision, when legitimate funds are sent into or out of the 
United States from/to an international venue for the purpose of committing a crime, the 
transaction constitutes money laundering. In such a scenario, the funds being laundered do 
not represent proceeds from a criminal act, but rather funds intended to be used for a 
criminal act. 

4.1.3. (U) Overview of Money Laundering Statutes 

(U) There are two primary money laundering statutes in 18 U.S.C. §§1956 and 1957. 

Section 1 956 has four basic statutory elements that must be addressed in criminal 
complaints and indictments: 

1 . (U) A financial transaction or attempted financial transaction must have taken place. 

2. (U) The transaction must involve proceeds from a specified unlawful activity. 

3. (U) The subject(s) must have had knowledge that the proceeds were derived from 
some form of criminal activity. 

4. (U) The subject(s) must have acted with specific intent to do one or more of the 
following: 


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• (U) Promote a specified unlawful activity. 

• (U) Avoid transaction reporting requirements. 

• (U) Conceal or disguise the source of the proceeds. 

• (U) Evade taxes. 

(U) (The word PACE can be used as a mnemonic to recall these specific intent types.) 

(U) Because of the requirement to prove specific intent, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 is often called the 
“specific intent” statute. 

(U) Section 1956 is broken up into three major components: 

1 . (U) The financial transaction provision, which addresses domestic transactions. 

2. (U) The international transfer provision, which relates to international transactions. 

3. (U) The sting provision, which is used in conjunction with undercover operations. 

(U) Section 1957 is often called the "spending statute" because it does not require proof of 
specific intent. Therefore, simply disposing of illegal proceeds can be considered money 
laundering. However, to prosecute an individual for an 18 U.S.C. § 1957 violation, the 
transaction must have been in an amount greater than $ 1 0,000. 

(U) For a more detailed discussion regarding 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 and other related 
statutes, refer to “ Appendix A: Legal Authorities. ” of this PG. 

4.2. (U) The Money Laundering Process 

(U) There are three steps in the money laundering process: placement, layering, and 
integration. The initial parting with, or disbursement of, these funds is known as placement. 
The funds may be used to finance bank or brokerage accounts, rent safe deposit boxes, 
purchase insurance contracts, gamble, of simply purchase products and services. The 
greatest risk of detection exists during the placement phase. 

(U) The second phase of the process, layering, involves separating the illicit funds from 
their original source through a series of financial transactions to create a complex web of 
transactions designed to hinder law enforcement. An example of layering is the transfer of 
illicit funds from one bank account to others held in different names. It is common for such 
accounts to exist at different banks domiciled in foreign jurisdictions. Shell companies and 
nominee accounts may be used to provide an additional layer of anonymity. 

(U) The integration phase is the third and final stage of the money laundering process. 
Integration occurs when the illicit funds have been seemingly “cleaned” and are ready to be 
used to purchase legitimate assets such as homes, boats, vehicles, and jewelry. Laundered 
funds may end up in semi-legitimate businesses where they are commingled with 
legitimately derived earnings. Such transactions often create significant opportunities for 
forfeiture. 

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4.3. (U) Money Laundering Methods 

(U) Tlte number and variety of methods used by criminals to launder money render it 
impossible to provide a complete listing. The means to launder money is limited only by the 
creativity and ability of the launderers themselves. However, some methods commonly 
observed by law enforcement warrant attention in this section. 

4.3.1. (U) Bulk Smuggling, 31 U.S.C. § 5332 

(U) Bulk smuggling of cash or monetary instruments is the physical movement of cash or 
monetary instruments across international borders. 

4.3.1. 1. (U) Cash Smuggling 

(U) Criminals use various methods to attempt to transport illicit cash out of the United 
States. Such methods include express packages, private aircraft or boats, commercial 
shipments, luggage, and vehicles - often concealing money in hidden compartments. The 
U.S./Mexican border is particularly vulnerable to bulk cash smuggling where ICE officials 
regularly disrupt smuggling attempts. 

(U) Large volumes of cash can be difficult for smugglers to conceal. For example, $1 
million in $20 bills weighs approximately 100 pounds and would be stacked approximately 
1 8 feet high. Therefore, launderers find more efficient ways of moving currency out of the 
United States, such as exchanging smaller bills for larger denominations of either U.S. or 
foreign currency, using stored value cards (SVC), informal value transfer systems, the black 
market peso exchange, the global financial system, or money services businesses (MSB). 

4.3.12. (U) Smuggling of Monetary Instruments 

(U) Illicit proceeds are not always in the form of cash. Other types of monetary instruments 
may be smuggled, including cashier’s checks, traveler’s checks, stocks, bonds, or 
certificates of deposit. 

4.3.2. (U) Stoked Value Devices 

(U) Stored value devices include cards that can store money or value for future use. These 
come in various forms, including: 


• (U) Smart cards. 

• (U) Gift cards. 


• (U) Prepaid debit cards. 

(U) Smart cards are prepaid and keep track of balances directly on the card through 
computer chips or other technology. Transaction and balance information are not maintained 
by the issuer or other third party. If the card is lost or stolen, the original purchaser cannot 
recover the card value, and the card can be used by anyone who possesses it. 


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(U) Gift cards can be purchased anonymously through retail outlets. They are sometimes 
pre-denominated and "association-branded," meaning they carry the Visa, MasterCard, or 
American Express logos. Gift cards generally do not have a reload feature, although there 
may be exceptions to this rule. Gift cards differ from smart cards in that transactions and 
balances are maintained by the issuer or a designated processor and can be replaced or 
cancelled if they are lost or stolen. 

(U) Prepaid debit cards (PDC) are association-branded and are often linked to bank accounts. 
PDC holders can reload the cards with additional value, use the cards to purchase products 
or services, and withdraw funds from automated teller machines (ATM) in virtually any 
country. As with gift cards, transactions and balances on PDCs are maintained by the issuer 
or a designated processor and can be replaced or cancelled if they are lost or stolen. While 
any type of PDC can be exploited by money launderers, those with no connections to bank 
accounts offer the greatest opportunities. 

(U) Stored value cards can also be defined based on their transaction cycle. The cycle for 
SVCs can be defined as either closed system or open system. 

(U) Closed system SVCs are issued by a specific retailer and can only be used to purchase 
the products or services of that retailer. Closed system SVCs can sometimes have a reload 
feature, but cannot be used for ATM withdrawals. An example of a closed system SVC is 
the AT&T (American Telephone and Telegraph) prepaid telephone card that can only be 
used for telephone calls. 

(U) Open system SVCs can generally be used for purchases at retailers who accept Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express, or Discover, as well as to withdraw funds at ATMs 
worldwide. In some cases, open system SVCs are limited to retail purchases. However, most 



(U) Open system PDCs, particularly those not linked to a bank account, can be purchased 
with very little personal information or verification by launderers. They can easily be 
transported without detection and can be used to withdraw funds at ATMs. They can then be 
reloaded with additional illegally derived funds with the intent of conducting other ATM 
withdrawals. 

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(U) Emerging technology will produce new forms of stored value devices. An example is 
the mobile payment, or “m-payment,” which permits funds to be stored and transferred 
though cellular telephones. 

(U) Figure 1 illustrates various prepaid cards that can be purchased on the Internet. It should 
be noted that the Vaya MasterCard features virtually anonymous purchase and use. 




Stored Value Cards 


fwSSsS a# 


llMi Vava™ MastcxCar-dCg? Card . 

Enjoy all' of the benefits of £ MasterCard® card' but with: 
Guaranteed Approval 

* No credit check, bank account. or'sccurity deposit 
required 

* Prepaid, with easy loading options 

* Add cashinstantly at thousands of retail locations 

* Purchasing power at more than 32 million merchants 
worldwide. 

* Cash Access at more than 900,000 ATMs 

* Send Cash 

* Transfer money instantly to other Vaya Card holders 


HOMELAND 

facial 


t W WM UUm VJr**3 

c- 


Figure 1. (U) Association-Branded Prepaid Cards 

4.3.3. (U) Informal Value Transfer Systejns (IVTS) 

(U) Informal value transfer systems, also known as underground banking systems, are 
informal networks of individuals and/or entities that have the ability to instantaneously 
transfer value without the physical movement of cash. Hawalas are a type of IVTS that have 
developed over a period of one hundred years. Historically, these underground systems have 
been operated and used by networks of individuals of similar ethnic origin. These informal 
networks flourished because of a mistrust of traditional banking systems. Hawalas allow the 
instantaneous transfer of funds from an individual in one country to an individual in another 
country by Hawaladars, the individuals responsible for arranging such transactions. 
Hawaladars can move money to a recipient overseas, usually through a telephone call to the 
Hawaladar ’s counterpart in a recipient’ s country. 

(U) It is important to note that Hawalas can also be used for legitimate purposes, such as 
sending money to family members in other countries where the financial system is less 
developed. However, the structure of Hawalas allows them to be exploited by money 
launderers as shown below in Figure 2. 


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Figure 2. (U) Basic Hawala 

4.3.4. (TJ) Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) 

(U) The Black Market Peso Exchange developed in response to 
restrictions that limited access to U.S. dollars in Colombia. To obtain U.S. dollars, 
Colombian nationals were required to obtain import permits, which could only be justified 
by their necessity to the government. Significant duties and taxes were imposed on such 
transactions. Colombian money brokers began offering U.S. dollars in the black market to 
circumvent this process. The BMPE is used primarily by Colombian drug traffickers who 
use Colombian money brokers and their agents in the United States to receive the proceeds 
of drug transactions without the physical transportation of cash across national borders. 
Figure 3 illustrates a basic BMPE transaction. 


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Black Market Peso Exchange 


Invoice Payment 

(in USD) 


USA Rs 

o.s. Businessperson 

la I liate I 



■ 2 



Drug Proems 

Money Broker ^ Drug Dealer 


ii 

*3 

i ‘I 

r 

u 

Mercl 

andise 

7 



Settlement I 
arrangemenfj 


Confirm receipt 
‘of USD 


®lEr 


_ 3 ! [H 


Colombia 

Money Broker 





Colombia 

Colombian 
Drug Cartel 


Figure 3. (U) Black Market Peso Exchange 
4.3.5. (U) Global Financial System 

(U) The global financial system consists of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, 
money services businesses, casinos, credit unions, and any other entity defined as a financial 
institution under the BSA. Because money services businesses are addressed in another 
section of this PG, this section focuses on the remaining categories. 

(U) Illicit funds can be transferred from account to account and from institution to 
institution in an effort by launderers to cloud the paper trail for law enforcement. With 
current technology, banking transactions can be conducted online, and international 
accounts can be established with relative ease. While such advancements have facilitated 
legitimate banking functions, they have also provided opportunities for criminals to more 
easily engage in layering transactions. The use of accounts established in the names of 
nominees or shell companies exacerbates the problem by creating an additional layer of 
anonymity. 

(U) Specific uses of the global financial system to launder money include: 


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• (U) Structuring: This is most often done when a criminal deposits funds into 
financial institutions in increments less than $10,000 in value in order to avoid the 
statutory requirement for filing Currency Transactions Reports (CTR). Lower level 
individuals (smurfs) are sometimes hired to conduct such transactions, typically 
using multiple financial institutions. This process is known as smurfing. The process 
usually involves three phases: First, funds are deposited into several accounts at 
different financial institutions. Second, the funds are wire-transferred and pooled 
into a single account in another location. Third, the funds are 
wire-transferred out of the country. 

• (U) Loan-back schemes: Such schemes involve illegal deposits at financial 
institutions where the criminal receives a "loan" from the bank, trust, corporation, or 
fiduciary. The loan is actually the criminal’s own illegally derived money. 

• (U) Insurance contract schemes: Insurance companies defined as financial 
institutions under the BSA must comply with certain reporting and AML compliance 
programs. However, it was only beginning May 2, 2006, that certain insurance 
companies were compelled to implement AML compliance programs. 

(U) Money launderers use various types of insurance contracts to conceal ill-gotten gains. 
The most common schemes involve life insurance contracts. In fact, more than 65 percent of 
all money laundering cases involving insurance contracts pertain, to life insurance and have 
some variation of the following schemes: 

• (U) Over-funding life insurance contracts followed by early withdrawals: The 
penalties are viewed as a cost of doing business. 

• (U) Establishing life insurance contracts for fictitious individuals: Death certificates 
are then falsified by corrupt doctors and are sent to insurance companies to process 
the claims. 

• (U) Purchasing life insurance contracts with a cooling-off period allows launderers 
to pay for the contracts and then liquidate them without penalty. Insurance 
companies issue checks that can then be deposited into banks free-and-clear. 

(U) It is important to note that any life insurance contract with a cash value can be exploited 
by money launderers. Key "red flags" regarding life insurance contracts include: 

• (U) Large " one-off 1 cash transactions. 

• (U) High premium payments relative to reported income. 

• (U) Policy holder’s lack of concern over charges and early redemption fees. 

• (U) Policy payments made by a third party or by multiple parties, indicating a 
possible nominee name on the contract itself. 


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• (U) Premiums received from offshore and/or lightly regulated financial 
intermediaries. 

• (U) Frequent changes of beneficiary. 

(U) Figure 4 illustrates how the global financial system can be exploited by criminals to 
launder money. 

The Use of Shell Companies & 
ca-cmspirato, ] The Global Financial System 


5 * 

Deliverftoeeeds 




Purchase Varlawa rife Policy in full, 
in co-coiisiiiralor's name 



Account of ABC. Ine. 



Figure 4. (U) Use of the Global Financial System to Launder Money 

• (U) The criminal deposits fraud proceeds into a U.S. bank account established in the 
name of shell company ABC, Inc. 

• (U) The criminal orders a wire transfer using a remote computer from a U.S. bank 
account to a bank account in Cypress in the name of shell company XYZ, Inc. 

• (U) The criminal then orders a wire transfer from XYZ, Inc., to a French insurance 
company to fund a whole life insurance policy in the name of a co-conspirator. 

• (U) As the criminal instructed, the co-conspirator cancels the contract early, pays an 
early termination penalty, and receives a check for the remaining cash amount. 


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• (U) The co-conspirator then deposits the check into a bank account free-and-clear 
and arranges to return the money to the criminal. 

• (U) The criminal uses the laundered funds to purchase assets. 

4.3.6. (U) Money.Services Businesses 

(U) Money services businesses provide a full range of financial services and products 
outside of the banking system. These products and services are offered to customers without • 
the need to establish accounts and often with minimal identification. MSBs are currently 
defined as financial institutions under the BSA and are subject to its requirements. MSBs 
remain an attractive avenue for launderers worldwide. 

(U) MSBs generally fall into one of five categories: 

1. (U) Money transmitters. 

2. (U) Currency exchangers. 

3. (U) Check cashers. 

4. (U) Issuers of money orders and traveler’s checks. 

5. (U) Sellers or redeemers of traveler’s checks, money orders, and stored value cards. 

(U) Money transmitters such as Western Union can send money to thousands of cities 
instantaneously or within 24 hours. The sheer volume of legitimate cash transactions 
through these companies provides an excellent hiding place for money laundering activity. 
Money transmitter services are inexpensive relative to other laundering channels and often 
transfer funds for customers with no face-to-face contact. 

(U) Currency exchangers (CE) exist in major cities, airports, and along international borders 
for the purpose of exchanging the currency of one country to that of another. CEs typically 
take the currency obtained from customers and deposit those funds into the CE’s bank 
account, thereby limiting the paper trail for law enforcement when tracing the illicit funds. 

In some cases, where the CEs are part of the laundering scheme, they may move currency 
for customers in bulk under the name of the CE to mask the identity of the source of the 
funds. 

(U) Casas de Cambio and giros are smaller versions of CEs. Once located only along the 
Mexican border, they are now found throughout the United States. Casas are used primarily 
to move money to Mexico, while giros are used to transfer funds to Colombia. 

(U) Check cashers allow criminals to convert checks to cash without an account, and often 
with little disclosure of personal information. The conversion of these checks (often the 
checks of fraud victims) by the check casher significantly thwarts law enforcement efforts to 
establish the identity of the check holder and develop evidence on the ultimate use of 
proceeds. 

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(U) Issuers of money orders and traveler’s checks include Western Union, MoneyGram, and 
the U.S. Postal Service. Money orders in particular are vulnerable to money laundering 
because if purchased in amounts under $3,000, they can be purchased anonymously or with 
little personal information about the purchaser. In the absence of other methods of 
identification such as surveillance cameras and witness interviews, it may be virtually 
impossible to obtain the identity of the true money order purchaser. 

(U) For further information on these and other money laundering schemes, refer to the U.S 
Money Laundering Threat Assessment, December 2005, which can be found at thq 

4.3.7. (U) Corporate Laundering Schemes 

(U) False sales or fraudulent invoicing is a means by which a criminal, using either real or 
bogus corporations, shows illicit funds as proceeds of seemingly real business transactions. 
The "corporation' 1 prepares invoices that are inflated or deflated, depending on which way 
the criminal wants to move f unds. This technique is often used in connection with sales of 
precious metals. For example T : I 

|The value of the sale is overinflated. Funds are transferred to the account of the 
foreign company to pay for the gold. The gold is then smuggled back out of the' country to 
be re-sold and re-shipped to the U.S. company. 

(U) Fraudulent foreign enterprises: Once outside the country, money can often be returned 
for investment in the United States by claiming a profit from a foreign business venture. 
Situating the bogus transaction in a financial haven country protects the scheme. In many 
cases, such transactions are also linked to tax fraud. 

4.3.8. (U) Digital Currency (E-Currency) 

(U) Digital currency firms offer an alternative to traditional paper currency. The issuance of 
digital currency is driven by two distinct motives. First, because digital currency is often 
backed by precious metals such as gold, digital currencies provide an easier, more 
cost-effective way to invest in the underlying commodity. Second, digital currency can be 
used as a means of international exchange because, unlike paper currency, digital currency 
is standardized across all countries. Digital currency providers are typically registered 
offshore, although many of their operations touch the United States in some way. 

(U) Digital currency accounts can be established online, often with very little personal 
information or verification. Accounts can be funded through digital currency exchange 
brokers (CEB) through various methods. In some cases, the CEBs can convert the digital 
currency of one firm to that of another. With just a few keystrokes on a computer, account 
holders can purchase products and services through participating vendors, or transfer digital 
currency units instantaneously to other account holders worldwide. 

(U) Digital currency serves many legitimate functions. Companies can use digital currency 
to facilitate payments to suppliers or disseminate dividends to shareholders. However, 


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because of the lax standards of many digital currency firms with regard to establishing AML 
procedures and controls and the current lack of government regulation, digital currency 
poses significant risks to society and provides a means for criminals to launder money or 
finance terrorist activity. 

4.4. (U) Money Laundering: Conducting Investigations 

(U) Money laundering investigations are similar to investigations of other financial crimes. 
Traditional investigative methods serve a valuable purpose, particularly when the criminal 
activity has been completed and opportunities for a proactive approach are unavailable. 
However, traditional investigative methods can often be used in conjunction with covert 
operations. The combination of both approaches can greatly enhance the extent and quality 
of the evidence obtained. 

(U) Money laundering investigations may be pursued by targeting the underlying criminal 
activity and tracing the illicit proceeds or by identifying the illegal money laundering 
operation and linking the funds to an SUA. While each investigation is unique in certain 
aspects, and extensive discussion regarding all available investigative methods is beyond the 
scope of this PG, there are certain generic investigative steps that warrant attention. These 
steps can be categorized as follows: 

4.5. (U) Initiating Money Laundering Predicated Investigations/Transactions 

4.5.1. (U) Traditional or Overt Investigations 

• (U) The case agent prepares an EC containing background information of the 
investigation and predication. 

• (U) SSA approval is obtained. If the case involves a SIM, additional approval is 
required as set forth in the DIOG, Section 1 0. 

4.5.2. (U) Sophisticated and Covert Investigative Methods 

4.5.2.1. (U) Pen Registers 

(U) Pen registers are obtained by submitting a court order to a telephone company. Pen 
registers can provide investigators with a detailed account of the subject’s calls, both made 
and received; the times and dates of the calls; and telephone numbers of the recipients or 
callers. This information can be used to identify potential co-conspirators and to establish 
the existence of relationships with subjects of other investigations or with individuals 
previously convicted of a crime. 

4.5.2.2. (U) Title m 

(U) A Title III, otherwise known as a “bug” or wiretap, is a valuable investigative method 
that allows an investigator to listen to real-time conversations of subjects or key individuals 
either on a telephone or in a particular location. Title Ills can also be obtained to physically 
observe individual actions on closed circuit television, computer, etc. Title His have the 

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potential to show a jury the subject’s intent, an admission of guilt, or the subject in the 
process of committing a crime. There is no better evidence than a subject’s own words. In 
order to obtain authorization for a Title in interception, there must be probable cause that 
the device or location is being used to discuss criminal activity. 

4.5.2.3. (U) Undercover Operations 

(U) UCOs are proactive investigations that involve the use of undercover employees and/or 
CHSs. UCOs, if managed properly, can result in substantial evidence during the 
investigation of money laundering and other criminal activities. Among the many benefits 
of UCOs are: 

• (U) Potential access to intelligence and/or evidence that would not otherwise be 
accessible. 

• (U) The ability to be proactive and prevent criminal activity from occurring or prevent 
the public from being victimized. 

• (U) The ability to tailor the investigation to specific evidentiary and prosecutorial 
needs. 

• (U) Publicity of a successful UCO, which may deter future criminal activity. 

For more information regarding UCOs, see Sections 3.1 .2 through 3.1.5 of this PG and 



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4.5.3. (U) Transactions that Involve the Use of a UCE 

4.5.3.1. (U) Money Laundering Transactions Under $1 Million Dollars in Total 

• (U) Obtain approval by EC from the SAC or ADIC. 

• (U) Provide a copy of the approved EC to AF/MLU (for information only). / 

4.5.3.2. (U) Money Laundering Transactions Under $1 Million Dollars and UCE 
Will Engage in More Than Five Separate Substantive Contacts with 
Subjects 

• (U) Obtain authority for a Group II UCO, unless a sensitive circumstance makes 
the investigation a Group I UCO. 

• (U) Obtain oral concurrence, followed by an official EC from the appropriate 
FBIHQ operational unit, based on case classification. 

• (U) Obtain concurrence by EC from the SAC or ADIC. 

• (U) Provide a copy of the approved EC to AF/MLU for information only. 

4.5.3.3. (U) Transactions in Excess of $1 Million Dollars in Total 

• (U) Obtain authority for a Group I UCO. 

• (U) Consult with the appropriate FBIHQ operational unit regarding the planned 
UCO. 

• (U) Prepare a Group I UCO proposal. The proposal must include: 
o A background of the investigation. 

o (U) The objectives of, and need for, the UCO. 
o (U) The subjects and predication. 

o (U) A detailed explanation of the proposed UCO's transactions and methods, 
o (U) The CHSs/UCEs to be used, 
o (U) The international aspects, if any. 
o (U) The sensitive circumstances that apply, 
o (U) A proposed budget (see the FGUSO for additional details). 

• (U) Provide the appropriate operational unit and AF/MLU with copies of the 
completed proposal. The appropriate operational unit will present the proposal to 
the CUORC for approval. 


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4.5.4. (U) Investigations/Transactions That Involve the Use of a CHS 

4.5.4.1. (IT) Without a Group I or Group II UCO: 

• (U) Obtain authorization from the field office SAC or ADIC. 

• (U) Provide informational copies to AF/MLU of all reports regarding money 
laundering transactions. 

4.5.4.2. (U) With a Group I or Group II UCO: 

(U) If the UCO is currently active, no further authorization is required, provided the 
approved money laundering cap has not been exceeded. 

4.6. (U) Requesting Exemption for Money Laundering Transactions with 

Terrorist Organizations 

• (U) Submit an EC to the appropriate operational unit based on case classification 
and include the following information: 

o (U) An explanation of the investigative need to conduct the transaction and the 
reason for it. 

a (U) An explanation as to why other investigative methods are insufficient. 

o (U) The costs/benefits of engaging in such transactions. 

o (U) The potential issues and liabilities to the FBI of engaging in such 
transactions. 

o (U) The estimated risks to third parties and U.S. citizens. 

o (U) Confirmation of authority of the CHS/UCE to engage in such undercover 
activity pursuant to the AGG-Dom. 

o (U) Written concurrence from the United States Attorney’s Office. 

o (U) Written approval from the Assistant Attorney General (AAG), Criminal 
Division, DOJ, pursuant to the AGG-Dom. 

(U) If the proposed transaction involves funds of a drug trafficking organization and the 
Department of the Treasury’s OF AC has issued an order to block such transaction, the 
following additional information is needed: 

• (U) Concurrence from OF AC. 

• (U) Authority from the AG; ultimate approval must be determined by the Director 
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4.9. (U) Traditional Interviews 

(U) Interviews can be classified as non-conffontational or confrontational. The following 
are brief explanations of both: 

4.9.1. (U) Non-confrontational 

(U) Non-confrontational interviews typically involve cooperative individuals who were 
not involved in the crime under investigation and have no ties to the subject. At the 
institutional level, this may include corporate employees, bank or post office personnel, 
and representatives of money services businesses, casinos, or other financial service 
providers. Other individuals who are typically non-confrontational are those who 
witnessed a particular event, but had no involvement in the criminal incident and have no 
relationship to the subject. Non-confrontational interviews in money laundering cases can 
be conducted to confirm the identity of an individual who engaged in a particular bank 
transaction or series of transactions; to confirm the identities of other individuals 
associated with the subject; and to clarify any observed suspicious behavior. 


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4.9.2. (U) Confrontational - 

(U) Confrontational interviews generally involve individuals who were, or may have 
been, involved in the money laundering or underlying criminal scheme, are friendly with 
the subject, or, even though not involved in the crime, have a general dislike or distrust of 
law enforcement. Confrontational interviews can be productive, if conducted properly. 
Individuals involved in the crime under investigation or who know the subject can 
potentially provide firsthand accounts of conversations regarding the scheme and 
generate new leads. In addition, such interviews may lead to the development of CHSs, 
which can be the catalyst for a more proactive undercover approach. 

4.10. (U) Subpoenas 

(U) The following types of subpoenas are commonly used in money laundering cases: 

(1) federal grand jury subpoenas, which are issued and returnable to the AUSA acting on 
behalf of the grand jury; (2) trial subpoenas, which may be issued by the AUSA or the 
court and are returnable to the clerk of the court; (3) administrative subpoenas, which 
may be issued by the SS A of an organized crime or drug squad or by a supervisory senior 
resident agent (SSRA), and are returnable to the FBI; and (4) regulatory subpoenas, 
which are issued by independent agencies such as the SEC and CTFC and are returnable 
to those agencies. With respect to each of these types of subpoenas, the goal is to request 
all relevant records while minimizing the risk that material might be produced beyond 
that which is relevant to the investigation. AF/MLU can provide samples of subpoena 
riders that will accomplish this. 

(U) It must also be noted that, with respect to federal grand jury subpoenas, Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 6(e) provides restrictions on persons with whom subpoenaed 
materials may be shared. The AUSA must be advised of all agents, analysts, contractors, 
or others involved in the investigation in order to approve their participation and issue a 
6(e) letter to each member of the investigative team. 

(U) Agents must comply with the Right to Financial Privacy Act when using 
administrative subpoenas for records from financial institutions. 

4.11. (U) Ex-Parte Orders 

(U) Ex-parte orders can be used to obtain tax records for an individual or entity. Tax 
records offer a significant amount of information that can support money laundering 
allegations because criminals generally do not report their illicit income to the IRS. In 
spite of the fact that their income may have been illegally obtained, launderers are still 
required to report the income on their tax returns or face possible tax evasion charges. A 
review of tax records, in relation to the subject’s lifestyle, may indicate that the subject 
failed to report income because it was illegally derived. For example, if the subject lived 
in, and exercised control over a home worth $1 million dollars, yet only reported income 
of $35,000 on his most recent tax return, assuming no significant appreciation in the 
home, this would likely indicate some other concealed source of income. Ex-parte orders 

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can be obtained by submitting an application to the court. It is a common misconception 
that the IRS is needed for this purpose. 

(U) The application for the ex-parte order is similar to an affidavit filed by an agent in 
support of a complaint, arrest, or seizure warrant. It must set forth reasonable cause that: 
(1) a federal violation has been committed; and (2) the tax returns will provide the most 
probative form of evidence. The tax return does not have to be the only means of 
acquiring this evidence. For example, in a case where there is probable cause to believe 
that a subject is using shell companies to launder money, it is possible that mail covers or 
a Title III would reveal some of this evidence, but the tax returns would be the most 
probative, as they would likely contain IRS Form 1 099 statements and lists of companies 
from which the subject received income. The agent must swear to the contents of the 
affidavit in front of a district court judge (magistrates do not have authority to enter an 
ex-parte tax return order). Once the order has been signed by the judge, the agent serves 
the order on the IRS facility designated for compliance in that district. In some districts, 
the order will require the tax returns to go back to the judge for review, after which the 
judge will provide them to the AUSA if they are determined to be relevant to the 
investigation. In other districts, the order will require the IRS to provide the records 
directly to the AUSA. As with any case where taxpayer information is involved, federal 
law requires that only persons working on the investigation be permitted to view the 
returns. In the event that copies are placed in an FBI file, there must be a cover EC or 
FD-302 captioned with the appropriate “taxpayer information” notation, which is 
available in either the EC or FD-302 macros. 

4.12. (U) Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and Letters Rogatory 

(U) Similar to subpoenas, MLATs can be used to obtain records or information from 
foreign jurisdictions. MLATs are contractual obligations between countries and create 
routine channels for obtaining a broad range of legal assistance on criminal matters. The 
type of assistance that can be obtained by MLATs includes taking testimony or 
statements of persons, obtaining documents and other physical evidence in a form 
admissible at trial, and executing searches and seizures. The amount of assistance that is 
available varies by treaty and is subject to the intricacies of each country’s law. The best 
way to handle a situation where an MLAT is being contemplated is to call the DOJ OIA 
at 202-514-0000. OIA has attorneys assigned for each country in order to provide expert 
advice on the likelihood of accomplishing the purpose of the MLAT in the necessary time 
period. OIA makes the official MLAT request on behalf of the United States. Agents 
seeking to submit an MLAT request must contact OIA at the earliest possible opportunity. 
Where the United States has no MLAT with a country, Letters Rogatory can be used; 
however, recipient countries have no obligation to comply with the Letters Rogatory, and 
the process can be lengthy. OIA will also provide advice on Letters Rogatory, as the 
procedures for obtaining Letters Rogatory will vary depending on the country involved. 


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4.13. (U) Physical Surveillance 

(U) Physical observation can help the investigator determine a subject’s day-to-day 
pattern of activity. Such patterns can reveal, for example, the identities of individuals 
with whom the subject meets on a daily basis, or whether the subject makes frequent 
visits to grocery stores or gas stations that are often used to transmit illicit funds. 
Surveillances must be viewed as opportunities to develop intelligence, leads on additional 
subjects and/or corrupt businesses, and evidence of the crime under investigation. 

4.14. (U) Records Checks 

(U) Records checks provide background information on subjects and their businesses that 
can be used to an investigator’s advantage. The checks may consist of arrest and criminal 
histories; Automated Case Support (ACS) checks; and Internet and public database 
searches including bankruptcy filings, deeds, judgments/liens, property tax records, voter 
registrations, building permits, and corporate/business records. Records can provide 
additional details on subjects in terms of their levels of risk; current and prior residences; 
marital and immigration statuses; and current and prior employer information. In addition, 
information obtained through records searches can facilitate the identification of a 
subjects assets for the nnrnns e nf forfeiture Databases that are available to FBI agents 

include ind 

(4) Dun and Bradstreet. ” 

(IJ) The information obtained must be used to assess the subject’s criminal capabilities, 
possible criminal intent and motivation, and any weak links that the investigator could 
exploit. Weak links may include a bitter ex-spouse or ex-employer, pending or past 
lawsuits to which the subject was a defendant, and failed businesses or bankruptcies. 

4.15. (U) Other 

rU) Other investigative methods such as | 

can be used, depending on the needs of a particular investigation. The h i e 

requirements for each of these methods are set forth in the DIOG, Section 1 1 . 

4.16. (U)' Financial Analysis 

(U) Financial analysis is a necessary and often critical tool in successful money 
laundering investigations. Laundering is a crime involving illicit money; therefore, 
knowing where the money is at any given time, and the path it took to get there, may be 
the most important information to present to a jury. The process begins with obtaining 
records from financial institutions, including all financial transactions related to the crime. 
When the investigating agent has specific account information, records can be obtained 
by sending subpoenas to institutions in the United States or MLAT/Letters Rogatory to 
institutions in foreign jurisdictions. When the investigator does not have specific account 
information, it may be obtained through USA PATRIOT Act 314(a) or Egmont requests. 
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(U) Once the records have been received, their contents must be placed in a format that 
allows the investigator or financial analyst to sort and test the data' more easily. In the 
absence of more sophisticated analytical tools, spreadsheet or databasesoftware packages 
such as Microsoft Excel or Access can be used for this purpose. Case agents must consult 
with an experienced financial analyst to determine the best analytical tool and data format 
for their particular investigative needs: 


(U) Additional information regarding the use oi 

below. 

4.16.1. (U) Obtaining and Analyzing Financial Records 



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• (U) Obtain additional underlying documentation necessary to illustrate that assets 
continue to be under the control of the subject(s). 

• (U) See the DIOG. Section 1 1 . 


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5. (U) Recordkeeping Requirements 

5.1. (U) Statistical Reporting for All Money Laundering Investigations 

(U) At the completion of a money laundering investigation, a statistical record must be 
made in the accomplishment section of the FD-515. This reporting must be made 
regardless of whether the case is classified as a 272 or whether the subjects were charged 
with a money laundering violation. 


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6. (U) Summary of Legal Authorities 

(U) Included in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (and its amendments of 1988) are 
money laundering statutes that have a wide range of applications for many FBI cases. 
Violations of money laundering laws are usually tied to other criminal activities, ranging 
from the various RICO predicates, drugs, bank fraud, terrorism, espionage, etc. 

6.1. (U) Primary Money Laundering Statutes 

• (U) 18 U.S.C. § 1956 - Laundering of monetary instruments. 

• (U) 18 U.S.C. § 1957 - Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from 
specific unlawful activity. 

6.2. (U) Related Criminal Statutes 

• (U) 18 U.S.C. § 1960 - Prohibition of unlicensed money-transmitting businesses. 

6.3. (U) Companion Forfeiture Statutes 

• (U) 18 U.S.C. § 981 - Civil forfeiture. 

• (U) 1 8 U.S.C. § 982 - Criminal forfeiture. 

(U) In addition, the PATRIOT Act of 2001 expanded money laundering and companion 
violations and enhanced law enforcement’s ability to investigate money laundering 
activity. The following represent the most relevant sections of the PATRIOT Act with 
regard to money laundering and terrorist financing activity: 

• (U) Section 3 1 2: Necessary controls for correspondent accounts. 

• (U) Section 313: Prohibiting business with foreign shell banks. 

• (U) Section 314 (a): Information sharing with law enforcement. 

• (U) Section 314 (b): Information sharing among financial institutions. 

• (U) Section 315: Foreign crimes as specified unlawful activities. 

• (U) Section 319: Treatment of interbank/correspondent accounts. 

• (U) Section 371: Bulk cash smuggling. 

• (U) Section 372: Currency reporting offenses. 

• (U) Section 373: Illegal money transmitting businesses. 

• (U) Section 405: Dependent/parallel transactions. 

• (U) Section 813: Terrorist activity as RICO predicate offenses. , 


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.4. (U) Federal Regulations 

(U) Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. 


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(U) Appendix A: Legal Authorities 

1. . (Ll) 18 U.S.C. § 1956 - Laundering of Monetary-Instruments 
(U) (a)(1) - Financial Transaction Provision 

(U) Part (A)(i) is directed toward situations where the financial transaction involves 
illegal proceeds that are used to promote criminal activity (e.g., illegal proceeds used to 
purchase drugs or smuggle money in support of terrorist activities). 

(U) Part (A)(ii) is directed toward situations where the financial transaction involves an 
intent to commit tax fraud or evasion. 

(U) Part (B)(i) is directed toward situations where the financial transaction involves 
illegal proceeds that are used to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or 
control of the proceeds (e.g., the subject places the illegal proceeds into a "legitimate" 
business in order to make the subject's wealth appear legitimate). 

(U) Part (B)(ii) is directed toward situations where the financial transaction is designed to 
avoid or attempt to avoid state or federal reporting requirements (e.g., a subject directs 
others [smurfs] to buy cashier's checks with illegal proceeds in amounts less than $10,000 
to avoid Currency Transaction Reporting requirements). 

(U) (a)(2) - International Transfer Provision (Transport, Transmit, or Transfer 
Funds) 

(U) Part (A) is directed toward situations where funds or monetary instruments are being 
moved into or out of the United States with the intent to promote an illegal activity (e.g., 
the proceeds are moved out of the United States to buy drugs or support of terrorist 
activities). 

(U) Part (B)(i) is directed toward situations where illegal funds or monetary instruments 
are moved into or out of the United States in order to conceal the nature, source, etc., of 
the illegal proceeds (e.g., the subject moves or transmits an illegal monetary instrument to 
an offshore account or business in order to conceal or legitimatize the money). 

(U) Part (B)(ii) is directed toward situations where illegal funds are moved into or out of 
the United States in order to avoid a state or federal transaction reporting requirement 
(e.g., subject moves the illegal funds out of the United States in amounts greater than 
$10,000 and does not file the appropriate Currency and Monetary Instrument Report). 

(U) Penalties: 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1) and (2) 

(1) (U) The criminal penalty for a violation of either Subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of § 

1 956 is a maximum fine of $500,000, or twice the value of the monetary 
instruments or funds involved, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more 
than 20 years or both. 

(2) (U) Violators of Subsections 1956(a)(1) and (a)(2) are also liable to the United 
States for a civil penalty of not more than the greater of the value of the property; 

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funds; or monetary instruments involved in the transaction, or $10,000. Such civil 
penalty is intended to be imposed in addition to any fine imposed for the criminal 
offense. 

(3) (U) For adjudication or enforcement purposes, the district courts have jurisdiction 
over any foreign person, including any financial institution authorized under the 
laws of a foreign country, against whom the action is brought, if service of 
process upon the foreign person is made under the Federal Rules of Civil' 
Procedure or the laws of the county in which the foreign person is found, and: 

(a) (U) The foreign person commits a money laundering offense under 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(a) involving a financial transaction that occurs in whole or in 
part in the United States. 

(b) (U) The foreign person converts to his or her own use property in which the 
United States has an ownership interest by virtue of the entry of an order of 
forfeiture by a court of the United States. 

(c) (U) The foreign person is a financial institution that maintains a bank 
account at a financial institution in the United States. Any district court may 
issue a pretrial restraining order or take any other action necessary to ensure 
that any bank account or other property held by the defendant in the United 
States is available to satisfy a judgment under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b). To 
accomplish this, district courts may appoint a federal receiver to collect, . 
marshal, and take custody, control, and possession of all assets of the 
defendant, wherever located, to satisfy a civil judgment under § 1956, a 
forfeiture judgment, or a criminal fine under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) or 1957, 
including an order of restitution to any victim of an SUA. A federal receiver 
may be appointed, upon application of a federal prosecutor or a federal or 
state regulator, by the court having jurisdiction of the defendant in the case. 
A federal receiver is an officer of the court, and the powers of the federal 
receiver include the powers enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 754, as well as 
standing equivalent to a federal prosecutor for the purposes of submitting 
requests to obtain information regarding the assets of the defendant from 
FinCEN of the Department of the Treasury, or from a foreign country 
pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, multilateral agreement, or 
other arrangement for international law enforcement assistance, provided 

■ that such requests are in accordance with the policies and procedures of the 
Attorney General. 

(4) (U) It should also be noted that the forfeiture provisions of this act (See 1 8 U.S.C. 
§ 981 and 982) may be applied in addition to civil and criminal penalties. (See 
Forfeiture PG for additional information regarding civil and criminal forfeiture.) 
Thus, a person who violates § 1956 by laundering $250,000 might have the funds 
civilly forfeited, be subject to a fine of up to $500,000 if convicted of the criminal 

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offense, and pay a civil penalty of another $250,000. For payment of the criminal 
fine and civil penalty, the government may look to other assets of the defendant 
who is not involved in the offense. 

(U) (a)(3) - Sting Provision, also known as Reverse Money Laundering Transaction 

A. (U) This subsection of the money laundering statute penalizes financial transactions 
involving the covert use of government funds or property, which is represented to be 
the proceeds of an SUA, when those financial transactions are conducted or attempted 
with the intent to: 


i. (U) Promote an SUA. 

ii'. (U) Conceal the nature of funds or property believed to be the proceeds of an SUA. 

iii. (U) Avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state or federal law. 

B. (U) Funds or property are represented to be proceeds when the representation is made 
by a law enforcement officer or other person (e.g., CHS) acting at the direction of a 
law enforcement officer. 

(0) Penalties: 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) 

(U) Maximum of 20 years imprisonment or a fine under Title 1 8 or both. 

2. (U) 18 U.S.C. § 1957 - Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived 
from SUA 


(U) This section is generally designed to address a subject who knowingly engages or 
attempts to engage in a monetary transaction involvin p criminally derived property 
greater than $ 10,000 and has been derived from SUA 



(U) Penalties: 18 U.S.C. § 1957 


(U) Maximum of ten years imprisonment or a fine under Title 1 8 or twice the amount of 
the criminally derived property involved in the transaction or both. 

(U) 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956/1957 Statute Definitions 


1 . (U) "Knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the 
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity" (as in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c) (1)) means 
that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds 
from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a 
felony under state or federal law, regardless of whether or not such activity is 
specifically defined as an SUA. 


2. (U) The term "conducts" (as in 18 U.S.C. §1956 (c) (2)) includes initiating, 
concluding, or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction. 


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3. (U) The term "transaction" (as in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c) (3)) includes a purchase; 
sale; loan; pledge; gift transfer; delivery; or other disposition, and with respect to a 
financial institution includes a deposit; withdrawal; transfer between accounts; 
exchange of currency; loan, extension of credit; purchase or sale of any stock, bond, 
certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument; use of a safe deposit box; or any 
other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by 
whatever means effected. 

4. (U) "Financial transaction" (as in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c) (4)) means a transaction that 
in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (1) involving the 
movement of funds by wire or other means, (2) involving one or more monetary 
instruments, or (3) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, 
or aircraft; or means a transaction involving the use of a financial institution that is 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any 
way or degree. 

5. (U) "Monetary instruments" (as in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c) (5)) means coin or 
currency of the United States or of any other country, traveler's checks, personal 
checks, bank checks, money' orders, investment securities in bearer form or otherwise 
negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto 
passes upon delivery. 

6. (U) The term "financial institution" (as in 18 U.S.C. §1956 (c) (6)) includes any 
financial institution, as defined in 31 U.S.C. § 53 12(a) (2), and any foreign bank as 
defined in 12 U.S.C. § 31.01. The following is a list of "financial institutions": 

(a) (U) An insured bank of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 

(b) (U) A commercial bank or trust company. 

(c) (U) A private banker. 

(d) (U) An agency or branch of a foreign bank in the United States. 

(e) (U) Any credit union. 

(f) (U) A thrift institution, 

(g) (U) A broker or dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 

(h) (U) A broker or dealer in securities or commodities. 

(i) (U) An investment banker or investment company. 

0) (U) A currency exchange. 

(k) (U) An issuer, redeemer, or cashier of traveler's checks, checks, money 
orders, or similar instruments, 

(l) (U) An operator of a credit card system. 

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(m) (U) An insurance company. 

(n) (U) A dealer in precious metals, stones, or jewels. 

(o) (U) A pawnbroker, 

(p) (U) A loan or finance company. 

(q) (U) A travel agency. 

(r) (U) A licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a 
business in the transmission of funds, including any person who engages as 
a business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people 
who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically 
or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system. 

(s) (U) A telegraph company. 

(t) (U) A business engaged in vehicle sales, including automobile, airplane, and 
boat sales. 

(u) (U) Persons involved in real estate closings and settlements. 

(v) (U) The U.S. Postal Service. 

(w) (U) An agency of the U.S. Government or of a state or local government 
arriving out a duty or power of a business (described in this paragraph). 

(x) (U) A casino, gambling casino, or gaming establishment with an annual 
gaming revenue of more than $1,000,000 and is licensed as a casino under 
the laws of any state or any political subdivision of any state or is an Indian 
gaming operation. 

(y) (U) Any business or agency that engages in any activity that the Secretary of 
the Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an activity that is similar to, 
related to, or a substitute for any activity in which any business (described in 
this paragraph) is authorized to engage. 

(z) (U) Any other business (designated by the Secretary of the Treasury) whose 
cash transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or 
regulatory matters. 

(aa) (U) Any company organized under the laws of a foreign country, a 
territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the 
Virgin Islands that engages in the business of banking, or any subsidiary or 
affiliate organized under such laws of any such country. This includes, 
without limitation, foreign commercial banks, foreign merchant banks, and 
other foreign institutions that engage in banking activities usually in 
connection with the business of banking in the countries where such foreign 
institutions are organized or operating (12 U.S.C. § 3101(7)). 

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7. (U) "Represented" (as in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)) means any representation made 
by a law enforcement officer or by another person at the direction of, or with the 
approval of, a federal official authorized to investigate or prosecute violations of 1 8 
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3). 

8. (U) "Monetary transaction" (as in 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (f) (1)) means the deposit, 
withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of 
funds or a monetary instrument by, through, or to a financial institution, but such term 
does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to 
representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. 

9. (U) "Criminally derived property" (as in 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (f) (2)) means any 
property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained from a criminal offense. 

10. (U) "SUA" (as in 18 U.S.C. § 1956) means: 

(a) (U) Any act or activity constituting an offense listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), 
except an act which is indictable under Subchapter II or Chapter 53 of Title 31. 

(b) (U) With respect to a financial transaction occurring in whole or in part in 
the United States, an offense against a foreign nation involving the manufacture, 
importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as in 21 U.S.C.); 
drug-type offenses; murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, destruction of 
property by means of explosive or fire, or a crime of violence (as defined in 1 8 
U.S.C. § 16); a fraud or any scheme or attempt to defraud, by or against a 
foreign bank (as defined in paragraph 7 of Section 1(b) of the International 
Banking Act of 1978); bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft, 
or embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of a public official; 
smuggling or export control violations involving an item controlled on the U.S. 
Munitions List established under Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. § 2778), or an item controlled under regulations under the Export 
Administration Regulations (Title 15, C.F.R., Parts 730-774); or an offense with 
respect to a multilateral treaty, either to extradite the alleged offender or to 
submit the case for prosecution, if the offender was found in the United States. 

(c) (U) Any act or acts constituting a continuing criminal enterprise (21 U.S.C. 

§ 848). 

(d) (U) An offense under the following: 


Citation 

SUA 

18 U.S.C. §32 

Relating to the destruction of aircraft. 

18 U.S.C. § 37 

Relating to violence at international airports. 


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Citation 

SUA 

18U.S.C. § 115 

Relating to influencing, impeding, or retaliating 
against a federal official by threatening or injuring 
the official’s family members. 

18U.S.C. § 152 

Relating to concealment of assets; false oaths and 
claims; or bribery. 

18 U.S.C. §215 

Relating to commissions or gifts for procuring 
loans. 

18U.S.C. §351 

Relating to congressional or cabinet officer 
assassination. 

18U.S.C. §§500-503 

Relating to certain counterfeiting offenses. 

18U.S.C. §513 

Relating to securities of states and private entities. 

18U.S.C. §541 

Relating to goods falsely classified. 

18U.S.C. §542 

Relating to entry of goods by means of false 
statements. 

18U.S.C. §545 

Relating to smuggling goods into the United States. 

18U.S.C. §549 

V 

Relating to removing goods from U.S. Customs 
custody. 

18U.S.C. §641 

Relating to public money, property, or records. 

18 U.S.C § 656 

Relating to theft, embezzlement, or misapplication 
by a bank officer or employee. 

18U.S.C. §657 

Relating to lending and credit and insurance 
institutions. 

18 U.S.C. §658 

‘ 

Relating to property mortgaged or pledged to farm 
credit agencies. 

18 U.S.C. §666 

Relating to theft or bribery concerning programs 
receiving federal funds. 


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Citation 


18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794, or 798 Relating to espionage. 


18U.S.C. §831 


Relating to prohibited transactions involving 
nuclear materials. 


18 U.S.C. § 844(f) or (i) 


18 U.S.C. § 875 


18 U.S.C. §922(1) 


18 U.S.C. § 924(n) 


18 U.S.C. §956 


18 U.S.C. § 1005 


18 U.S.C. §1006 


18 U.S.C. §1007 


18 U.S.C. § 1014 


18 U.S.C. § 1030 


18 U.S.C. § 1032 


Relating to destruction by explosives or fire of 
government property or property affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce. 


Relating to interstate communications. 


Relating to the unlawful importation of firearms. 


Relating to firearms trafficking. 


Relating to conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or 
injure certain property in a foreign country. 


Relating to bank fraud and embezzlement. 


Relating to fraudulent credit institution entries. 


Relating to fraudulent Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation transactions. 


Relating to fraudulent loan or credit applications. 


Relating to computer fraud and abuse. 


Relating to concealment of assets from a 
conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent of a 
financial institution. 


18 U.S.C. §1111 


18 U.S.C. §1114 


Relating to murder. 


Relating to the murder of U.S. law enforcement 
officials. 


18 U.S.C. § 1116 


Relating to murder of foreign officials, official 
guests, or internationally protected persons. 



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Citation 

SUA 

18U.S.C. § 1201 

Relating to kidnapping. 

18U.S.C. § 1203 

Relating to hostage taking. 

18U.S.C. §1361 

Relating to willful injury of government property. 

18U.S.C. § 1363 

Relating to destruction of property within the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. 

18U.S.C. § 1708 

Relating to theft from the mail. 

18U.S.C. § 1751 

Relating to Presidential assassination. 

18U.S.C. §§2113 or 2114 

Relating to bank and postal robbery and theft. 

18U.S.C. § 2280 

Relating to violence against maritime navigation. 

18U.S.C. § 2281 

■ 

Relating to violence against maritime fixed 
platforms. 

18U.S.C. §2319 

Relating to copyright infringement. 

18U.S.C. §2320 

Relating to trafficking in counterfeit goods or 
services. (FBI) 

18U.S.C. § 2332 

Relating to terrorist acts abroad against U.S. 
nationals. 

18 U.S.C.§ 2332a 

Relating to use of weapons of mass destruction. 

18 USC § 2332b 

Relating to international terrorist acts transcending 
national boundaries. 

18U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B 

Relating to providing material support to terrorists. 

19U.S.C. § 1590 

Relating to aviation smuggling. 

49 U.S.C. § 46502 

Relating to aircraft piracy. 

Chemical Diversion and 
Trafficking Act of 1988 

A felony violation relating to precursor and 
essential chemicals. 


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Citation 

SUA 

Section 15 of the Food Stamp 
Act of 1977 

Relating to Food Stamp Fraud involving a quantity 
of coupons having a value of not less than $5,000. 
(FBI) 

21 U.S.C. § 863, Controlled 
Substance Act 

Relating to transportation of drug paraphernalia. 

Section 38(c) of the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 
2778) 

Relating to criminal violations. 

Section 1 1 of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (50 
U.S.C. App. 2410) 

Relating to violations. 

Section 206 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (50 U.S.C. §1702) 

Relating to penalties. 

Section 16 of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 
3) 

Relating to offenses and punishment. 

33 U.S.C. § 1251 etseq. 

Felony offenses relating to the discharge of 
pollutants into the Nation's waters. 

33 U.S.C. § 1401 etseq. 

Felony offenses relating to the dumping of 
materials into ocean waters. 

33 U.S.C. § 1901 etseq. 

Felony offenses relating to the discharge of 
pollutants from ships. 

42 U.S.C. § 300f etseq. 

Felony offenses related to the safety of public water 
systems. 

42 U.S.C. § 1490s(a)(l) 

Relating to equity skimming. 

Foreign Agents Registration Act 
of 1938 

Any felony violation of the act. 


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Citation 

SUA 

Foreign Corrupt Practice Act ■ 

Any felony violation of the act. 

18 U.S.C. §§669, 1035, 1347, 
and 1518 

Any act or activity constituting an offense 
involving a federal health care offense. 

42 U.S.C. §6901 etseq. 

Felony offenses relating to resource conservation 
and recovery. 


(e) (U) Any act or activity constituting one of the predicate offenses to the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18, U.S.C. § 1961(1)) 
except an act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act. These offenses are as follows: 

1 . (U) Any act or threat involving: 

• (U) Murder. 

• (U) Kidnapping. 

• (U) Gambling. 

• (U) Arson. 

• (U) Robbery. 

• (U) Bribery. 

• (U) Extortion. 

• (U) Dealing in obscene matter. 

• (U) Dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in 
Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable as a 
state felony. ' 

2. (U) Any act which is indictable under any of the following: 


Citation 

SUA 

18 U.S.C. §201 

Relating to bribery. 

18 U.S.C. §224 

Relating to sports bribery. 

18 U.S.C. §§471-473 

Relating to counterfeiting. 

18 U.S.C. §659 

Relating to theft from interstate shipment if 
the act indictable under 1 8 U.S.C. § 659 is 


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Citation 

SUA 


felonious. 

18U.S.C. §664 

Relating to embezzlement from pension 
and welfare funds. 

18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894 

Relating to extortionate credit transactions. 

18U.S.C. § 1028 

Related to fraud and related activity in 
connection with identification documents. 

18 U.S.C. § 1029 

Relating to fraud and related activity in 
connection with access devices. 

18 U.S.C. § 1084 

Relating to the transmission of gambling 
information. 

18 U.S.C. § 1341 

Relating to mail fraud. 

18 U.S.C. § 1343 

Relating to wire fraud. 

18 U.S.C. § 1344 

Relating to financial institution fraud. 

18 U.S.C. § 1425 

Relating to the unlawful procurement of 
citizenship or naturalization. 

18 U.S.C. § 1426 

Relating to the reproduction of 
naturalization or citizenship papers. 

18 U.S.C. § 1427 

Relating to the sale of naturalization or 
citizenship papers. 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1465 

Relating to obscene matter. 

18 U.S.C. § 1503 

Relating to obstruction of justice. 

18 U.S.C. § 1510 

Relating to obstruction of criminal 
investigations. 

18U.S.C. § 1511 

Relating to the obstruction of state or local 
law enforcement. 

18 U.S.C. § 1512 

Relating to tampering with a witness. 


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Citation 

SUA 


victim, or an informant [CHS]. 

18U.S.C. § 1513 

Relating to retaliating against a witness, 
victim, or an informant [CHS]. 

18U.S.C. § 1542 

Relating to false statement in application 
and use of passport. 

18U.S.C. § 1543 

Relating to forgery or false use of passport. 

18U.S.C. § 1544 

Relating to misuse of passport. 

18U.S.C. § 1546 

Relating to fraud and misuse of visas, 
permits, and other documents. 

18U.S.C. §§ 1581-1588 

Relating to peonage and slavery. 

18U.S.C. § 1951 

Relating to interference with commerce, 
robbery, or extortion. 

18 U.S.C. § 1952 

Relating to racketeering. 

18U.S.C. § 1953 

Relating to interstate transportation of 
wagering paraphernalia. 

18 U.S.C. § 1954 

Relating to unlawful welfare fund 
payments. 

18 U.S.C. § 1955 

Relating to the prohibition of illegal 
gambling business. 

18 U.S.C. § 1956 

Relating to the laundering of monetary 
instruments. 

18 U.S.C. §1957 

Relating to engaging in monetary 
transactions in property derived from SUA. 

18 U.S.C. § 1958 

Relating to use of interstate commerce 
facilities in the commission of-murder-for- 
hire. 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2251A, 

Relating to sexual exploitation of children. 


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— 

Citation 

SUA 

2252, and 2260 


18 U.S.C. §§ 2312 and 2313 

Relating to interstate transportation of 
stolen motor vehicles. 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315 

Relating to interstate transportation of 
stolen property. 

18 U.S.C. §2318 

Relating to trafficking in counterfeit labels 
for phonorecords; computer programs or 
computer program documentation; or 
packaging and copies of motion pictures or 
other audiovisual works. 

18 U.S.C. §2319 

Relating to criminal infringement of a 
copyright. 

18 U.S.C. § 2319A 

Relating to unauthorized fixation of, and 
trafficking in, sound recordings and music 
videos of live musical performances. 

18 U.S.C. §2320 

Relating to trafficking in goods or services 
bearing counterfeit marks. 

18 U.S.C. §2321 

Relating to trafficking in certain motor 
vehicles or vehicle parts. 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346 

Relating to trafficking in contraband 
cigarettes. 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 

Relating to white slave traffic. 


3. (U) Any act which is indictable under: 

* (U) 29 U.S.C. § 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to 
labor organizations). 

• (U) 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds). 

4. (U) Any offense involving fraud connected with a case under Title 1 1 (except 
a case under § 157 of this title); fraud in the sale of securities; or the felonious 
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or 
otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in 

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Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), punishable under any law of 
the United States. 

5. (U) Any act that is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transaction 
Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 531 1 et seq. 

6. (U) Any act that is indictable under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 
Section 274 (relating to bringing in or harboring certain aliens), § 277 
(relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter the United States), or 

§ 278 (relating to importation of an alien for immoral purpose) if the act 
indictable under such section of such Act was committed for the purpose of 
financial gain, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 et seq. 

7. (U) Any act that is indictable under any provision listed in 1 8 U.S.C. § 2332b 
(g)(5)(B). 

(U) NOTE: The investigatory jurisdiction for money laundering violations is shared by 
numerous federal law. enforcement agencies and is set forth in a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the DOJ, the Department of the Treasury, and the United States 
Postal Service, which is set forth in Appendix C. Generally, this jurisdiction is 
determined by the particular SUA(s) involved. For further information regarding money 
laundering jurisdiction, see Section 3.5 of this PG. 

(U) Venue 

(1) (U) Except as provided in the next paragraph, a prosecution for an offense under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 or 1957 may be brought in any district in which the financial 
or monetary transaction is conducted, or any district where a prosecution for the 
underlying SUA could be brought, if the defendant participated in the transfer of 
the proceeds of the SUA from that district to the district where the financial or 
monetary transaction is conducted. 

(2) (U) A prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy offense under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 
or 1 957 may be brought in the district where venue would lie for the completed 
offense under the previous paragraph, or in any other district where an act in 
furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy took place. 

(3) (U) For purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, a transfer of funds from one place to 
another, by wire or any other means, constitutes a single, continuing transaction. 
Any person who conducts (as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(1)(2)) any 
portion of the transaction may be charged in any district in which the transaction 
takes place. 

(1) (U) Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business (18 U.S.C. § 1960) 

(2) (U) The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti terrorism 
Act of 200 1 was incorporated into the PATRIOT Act and was intended to 
significantly increase the United States’ ability to combat the financing of 

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terrorism. The scope of 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 960 is expanded to include any business, 
licensed or unlicensed, that involves the movement of funds that the defendant 
knows were derived from a criminal offense, or were intended to be used “to 
promote or support unlawful activity.” It would not be necessary for the 
government to show that the business was a storefront or other formal business 
open to walk-in trade. To the contrary, it would be sufficient to show that the 
defendant offered his/her services as a money transmitter to another. 

(3) (U) It is already an offense under §§ 1956 and 1957 for any person to conduct a 
financial transaction involving criminally derived property. Section 1 957 has a 
$10,000 threshold requirement, while §1956 requires proof of specific intent 
either to promote another offense or to conceal or disguise the criminal proceeds. 
On the other hand, § 1960 contains neither of these requirements if the property is 
criminal proceeds; or alternatively, if there is proof that the purpose of the 
financial transaction was to commit another offense, it does not require proof that 
the transmitted funds were tainted by any prior misconduct. Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 

981 and 982 contain civil and criminal forfeiture provisions for violations of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, and 1960. 

(4) (U) The following is the full text of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1960: 

(a) (U) Whoever knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns 

all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business, shall be fined in accordance 

with this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 

(b) (U) As used in this section - 

(1) (U) The term ‘unlicensed money transmitting business’ means a money transmitting 
business which affects interstate or foreign commerce in any manner or degree and: 

(A) (U) Is operated without an appropriate money transmitting license in a state 
where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony under state 
law, whether or not the defendant knew that the operation was required to be 
licensed or that the operation was so punishable. 

(B) (U) Fails to comply with the money transmitting business registration requirements 
under section 5330 of title 31, U.S. Code, or regulations prescribed under such 
section. 

(C) (U) Otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds that are known 
to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to 
be used to promote or support unlawful activity. 

(2) (U) The term ‘money transmitting’ includes transferring funds on behalf of the 
public by any and all means including but not limited to transfers within this 
country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft, facsimile, or courier. 


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(3) (U) The term ‘State’ means any State of the U.S., the District of Columbia, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of 
theU.S. 

4. (U) Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act 

(U) The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act was enacted in 1970 to 
regulate depository institutions such as banks, credit unions, and thrifts. The Bank 
Secrecy Act established requirements for recordkeeping and reporting to identify the 
origin and movement of cash or other monetary instruments transported or transmitted 
into or out of the United States or deposited in financial institutions. The BSA requires 
certain individuals, banks, and other financial institutions to file currency reports with the 
Department of the Treasury, identify the individuals conducting transactions, and 
maintain appropriate documentation of financial transactions. 

(U) The Money Laundering Control Act (MCLA) of 1 986 imposes criminal liability on 
individuals and financial institutions that knowingly assist in the laundering of money or 
structure transactions to avoid reporting them. The MLCA required banks to establish 
and maintain procedures designed to ensure compliance with the requirements of the 
BSA. 

(U) The Suspicious Activity Report was created in 1996 as a means for financial 
institutions to report known or possible violations of criminal law or the BSA, or 
suspicious transactions related to money laundering. Filing was deemed mandatory for all 
entities defined as financial institutions. Since approximately 1990, the definition of 
financial institutions has been expanded to cover money services businesses, casinos, 
card clubs, securities firms, the insurance industry, and banks. 



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(U) The following sections of the act represent its most substantive components with 
regard to money laundering and terrorist financing: 

Sec, 312. (U) Special Due Diligence for Correspondent Accounts and Private 
Banking Accounts 

(U) This section requires each financial institution that establishes, maintains, administers, 
or manages a private banking account or a correspondent account in the United States for 
a non-USPER (United States Person), including a foreign individual visiting the United 
States or a representative of a non-USPER, establish appropriate, specific, and where 
necessary, enhanced, due diligence policies, procedures, and controls that are reasonably 
designed to detect and report instances of money laundering through those accounts. The 
enhanced due diligence policies, procedures, and controls required under paragraph (1) 
must, at a minimum, ensure that the financial institution in the United States takes 
reasonable steps to: 

• (U) Ascertain for any such foreign bank, the shares of which are not publicly 
traded, the identity of each of the owners of the foreign bank, and the nature and 
extent of the ownership interest of each such owner. 

• (U) Conduct enhanced scrutiny of such account to guard against money 
laundering and report any suspicious transactions under subsection (g). 

• (U) Ascertain whether such foreign bank provides correspondent accounts to 
other foreign banks and, if so, the identity of those foreign banks and related due 
diligence information, as appropriate under paragraph (1). 


Sec. 313. (U) Prohibition on U.S. Correspondent Accounts with Foreign Shell Banks 

(U) This section prohibits a financial institution from establishing, maintaining, 
administering, or managing a correspondent account in the United States for, or on behalf 
of, a foreign bank that does not have a physical presence in any country. 

Sec. 314(a). (U) Cooperative Efforts to Deter Money Laundering 

Tills section provides that financial institutions must query their account holder databases 
in response to law enforcement requests in significant money laundering and terrorist 
financing investigations. 

Section 314(b). (U) Cooperative Efforts Among Financial Institutions 

This section provides that financial institutions may share suspicious activity reports with 
one another. 

Sec. 315. (U) Inclusion of Foreign Corruption Offenses as Money Laundering 
Crimes 


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(U) This section makes the use of proceeds derived from violations of a foreign law, or 
more specifically, "an offense with respect to which the U.S. would be obligated by a 
multilateral treaty, either to extradite the alleged offender or to submit the case for 
prosecution, if the offender were found within the territory of the U.S." a money 
laundering offense. 

Sec. 319. (U) Forfeiture of Funds in U.S. Interbank Accounts 

(U) This section states that, for the purpose of a forfeiture under this section or under the 
Controlled Substances Act, if funds are deposited into an account at a foreign bank, and 
that foreign bank has an interbank (correspondent) account in the United States with a 
covered financial institution, the funds are deemed to have been deposited into the 
interbank account in the United States, and any restraining order, seizure warrant, or 
arrest warrant in rem regarding the funds may be served on the covered financial 
institution, and funds in the interbank account, up to the value of the funds deposited into 
the account at the foreign bank, may be restrained, seized, or arrested. 

Section 319(b) (U) of the USA PATRIOT Act 

(U) This section authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury or the Attorney General to issue 
a summons or subpoena to any foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account in 
the United States, and to request records related to such correspondent account, including 
records maintained outside of the United States relating to the deposit of funds into the 
foreign bank. On September 23, 2002, the AG delegated this authority, pursuant to 31 
U.S .C. § 53 1 8(k)(3), to the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division and to 
the U.S. Attorneys (subject to the approval of the Criminal Division, DOJ). 

(U) Service of summons or subpoena - A summons or subpoena issued by the Secretary 
of the Treasury or the Attorney General may be served on the foreign bank in the United 
States if the foreign bank has a representative in the United States or in a foreign country 
pursuant to any mutual legal assistance treaty, multilateral agreement, or other request for 
international law enforcement assistance. 

(U) Other provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5318 - The law requires domestic financial 
institutions that maintain correspondent accounts for foreign banks to maintain records 
identifying the owners of the foreign bank and the name and address of a person who 
resides in the United States and is authorized to accept service of legal process for , 
records regarding the correspondent account. In addition, within seven days after 
receiving a written request from a federal law enforcement officer, the domestic financial 
institution must provide the identifying information. Finally, a domestic financial 
institution must terminate any correspondent relationship with a foreign bank no later 
than ten business days after receiving written notice from the Secretary of the Treasury or 
the AG (in each case after consultation with the other) that the foreign bank has failed to 
either to comply with the subpoena or to initiate proceedings to contest it. These new 
provisions will assist the FBI in obtaining information concerning deposits of funds into 
foreign banks that have correspondent accounts with U.S. banks, particularly in instances 

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where the United States cannot obtain cooperation from other governments or foreign 
financial institutions. 

(U) Use of this new authority, however, is likely to be controversial and may adversely 
affect U.S. bilateral or multilateral law enforcement relations. Therefore, USAs are 
required to obtain approval from the AFMLS, Criminal Division, DOJ, prior to issuing a 
subpoena or summons. 

Sec. 371. (U) Bulk Cash Smuggling into or out of the United States (31 U.S.C. § 5332) 
(U) This section: 

(1) (U) Makes the act of smuggling bulk cash itself a criminal offense. 

(2) (U) Authorizes forfeiture of any cash or instruments of the smuggling offense. 

(3) (U) Emphasizes the seriousness of the act of bulk cash smuggling. 

(U) Whoever, with the intent to evade a currency reporting requirement under 31 U.S.C. 

§ 53 1 6, knowingly conceals more than $ 1 0,000 in currency or other monetary 
instruments on the person of such individual or in any conveyance, article of luggage, 
merchandise, or other container, and transports or transfers or attempts to transport or 
transfer such currency or monetary instruments from a place within the United States to a 
place outside of the United States, or from a place outside the United States to a place 
within the United States, is guilty of a currency smuggling offense and subject to 
punishment. 

(U) For purposes of this section, the concealment of currency on the person of any 
individual includes concealment in any article of clothing worn by the individual or in 
any luggage, backpack, or other container worn or carried by such individual. 

Sec. 372. (U) Forfeiture in Currency Reporting Cases 

(U) This section authorizes civil and criminal forfeiture for violations of currency 
reporting laws and regulations. (See 31 U.S.C. § 5317.) 

Sec. 373. (U) Illegal Money Transmitting Businesses 

(U) This section modified 18 U.S.C. § 1960, Prohibition of Unlicensed Money . 
Transmitting Businesses, which previously made it illegal to run a money transmitting 
business without a license only if the individual was aware of such licensing 
requirements. The amendment specifically states that “Whoever knowingly conducts, 
controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an unlicensed money 
transmitting business, shall be fined in accordance with this title or imprisoned not more 
than 5 years, or both.” 

(U) The term "unlicensed money transmitting business" means a money transmitting 
business that affects interstate or foreign commerce in any manner or degree and is 
operated without an appropriate money transmitting license in a state where such 
operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony under state law, whether or not the 

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defendant knew that the operation was required to be licensed or that the operation was 
so punishable, fails to comply with the money transmitting business registration 
requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 5330, or regulations prescribed under such section; or 
otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the 
defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to be 
used to promote or support unlawful activity. 

Sec. 813. (U) Inclusion of Acts of Terrorism as Racketeering Activity 

(U) This section includes terrorism as a predicate offense for the RICO Act, which 
proscribes acquiring or operating an enterprise whose activities affect interstate or foreign 
commerce. 

(U) In addition, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 
renewed and enhanced the USA PATRIOT Act. The following is one such enhancement: 

Sec. 405. (U) Money Laundering Through Hawalas 

(U) 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1) is amended by adding at the end the following: “For 
purposes of this paragraph, a financial transaction shall be considered to be one involving 
the proceeds of SUA if it is part of a set of parallel or dependent transactions, any one of 
which involves the proceeds of SUA, and all of which are part of a single plan or 
arrangement.” 

(U) This section has clear implications for Hawalas. Consider the following example: 
Illicit proceeds are provided to the Hawaladar who deposits them into the Hawaladar’s 
bank account. Funds from a separate Hawaladar - controlled account are then transferred 
to the recipient overseas. This section now considers both transactions to be money 
laundering. 

6. (U) Related Statutes and Regulations 

(U) Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering (ITAR) Statute 

(U) The money laundering violations (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957) and Title 31 
violations handling the reporting of currency transactions (acts indictable under 
Subchapter II of Chapter 53 of Title 31, U.S. Code) have been added as predicate 
offenses (unlawful activities) for the ITAR Statute (18 U.S.C. § 1952). • 

(U) Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications 

(U) 18 U.S.C. § 2516, also referred to as Title m, includes the money laundering 
violations (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957) within the enumerated offenses that authorize 
the interception of communications. 

(U) Termination of Correspondent Relationship (31 U.S.C. § 5318(k)(3)(C)) 

(1) (U) Termination upon receipt of notice - A financial institution must terminate 
any correspondent relationship with a foreign bank no later than ten business days 
after receiving written notice from the Secretary of the Treasury or the Attorney 

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General (in each case, after consultation with the other) that the foreign bank has 
failed to comply with a summons or subpoena; or to initiate proceedings in a U.S. 
court contesting such summons or subpoena. 

(2) (U) Limitation on liability - A financial institution may not be liable to any person 
in any court or arbitration proceeding for terminating a correspondent relationship. 

(3) (U) Failure to terminate relationship - Failure to terminate a correspondent 
relationship renders the financial institution liable for a civil penalty of up to 
$10,000 per day until the correspondent relationship is terminated. 

(U) Foreign Bank Records - Acceptance of Service (31 U.S.C. § 318(k) (3)(B)) 

(1) (U) Maintaining records in the United States - Any financial institution that 
maintains a correspondent account in the United States for a foreign bank must 
maintain records in the United States identifying the owners of such foreign bank 
and the name and address of a person who resides in the United States and is 
authorized to accept service of legal process for records regarding the 
correspondent account. 

(2) (U) Law enforcement request - When the covered financial institution receives a 
written request from a federal law enforcement officer for information required to 
be maintained as stated in the previous paragraph, it must provide the information 
to die requesting officer no later than seven days after receiving the request. 


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(U) Appendix B: FATF Forty Recommendations 

(U) (Please note that the Forty Recommendations set forth below have been 
reprinted verbatim from the FATF Web site, WNvw.fatg-gafi.org, and thus contain 
the European spellings of certain words.) 

A. (U) Legal Systems 

(U) Scope of the criminal offence of money laundering 

1. (U) Countries should criminalize money laundering on the basis of the 
United Nations Convention against Elicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (the Vienna Convention) and the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 (the 
Palermo Convention). 

(U) Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious 
offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences. 
Predicate offences may be described by reference to all offences, or to a 
threshold linked either to a category of serious offences or to the penalty 
of imprisonment applicable to the predicate offence (threshold approach), 
or to a list of predicate offences, or a combination of these approaches. 

(U) Where countries apply a threshold approach, predicate offences should 
at a minimum comprise all offences that fall within the category of serious 
offences under their national law or should include offences which are 
punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one year’s imprisonment 
or for those countries that have a minimum threshold for offences in their 
legal system, predicate offences should comprise all offences, which are 
punished by a minimum penalty of more than six months imprisonment. 

(U) Whichever approach is adopted, each country should at a minimum 
include a range of offences within each of the designated categories of 
offences. 

(U) Predicate offences for money laundering should extend to conduct that 
occurred in another country, which constitutes an offence in that country, 
and which would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred 
domestically. Countries may provide that the only prerequisite is that the 
conduct would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred 
domestically. 

(U) Countries may provide that the offence of money laundering does not 
apply to persons who committed the predicate offence, where this is 
required by fundamental principles of their domestic law. 

2. (U) Countries should ensure that: 


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a) (U) The intent and knowledge required to prove the offence of 
money laundering is consistent with the standards set forth in the 
Vienna and Palermo Conventions, including the concept that such 
mental state may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. 

b) (U) Criminal liability, and, where that is not possible, civil or 
administrative liability, should apply to legal persons. This should 
not preclude parallel criminal, civil or administrative proceedings 
with respect to legal persons in countries in which such forms of 
liability are available. Legal persons should be subject to effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. Such measures should be 
without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals. 

(U) Provisional measures and confiscation 

3. (U) Countries should adopt measures similar to those set forth in the 
Vienna and Palermo Conventions,- including legislative measures, to 
enable their competent authorities to confiscate property laundered, 
proceeds from money laundering or predicate offences, instrumentalities 
used in or intended for use in the commission of these offences, or 
property of corresponding value, without prejudicing the rights of bona 
fide third parties. 

(U) Such measures should include the authority to: (a) identify, trace and 
evaluate property which is subject to confiscation; (b) carry out 
provisional measures, such as freezing and seizing, to prevent any dealing, 
transfer or disposal of such property; (c) take steps that will prevent or 
void actions that prejudice the State’s ability to recover property that is 
subject to confiscation; and (d) take any appropriate investigative 
measures. 

(U) Countries may consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds 
or instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal 
conviction, or which require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin 
of the property alleged to be liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a 
requirement is consistent with the principles of their domestic law. 

B. (U) Measures to be Taken by Financial Institutions and Non- 
fxnancial Businesses and Professions to Prevent Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing 

4. (U) Countries should ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do 
not inhibit implementation of the FATF Recommendations. 

(U) Customer due diligence and record-keeping 

5. (U) Financial institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or 
accounts in obviously fictitious names. 


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(U) Financial institutions should undertake customer due diligence 
measures, including identifying and verifying the identity of their 
customers, when: 

a) (U) Establishing business relations. 

b) (U) Carrying out occasional transactions: (i) above the 
applicable designated threshold or (ii) that are wire transfers in the 
circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to Special 
Recommendation VII. 

c) (U) There is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist 
financing. 

d) (U) The financial institution has doubts about the veracity or 
adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data. 

(U) The customer due diligence (CDD) measures to be taken are as 
follows: 

a) (U) Identify the customer and verify the customer’s identity 
using reliable, independent source documents, data, or information. 

b) (U) Identify the beneficial owner, and take reasonable measures 
to verify the identity of the beneficial owner so that the financial 
institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is. 

For legal persons and arrangements, this should include financial 
institutions taking reasonable measures to understand the 
ownership and control structure of the customer. 

c) (U) Obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of 
the business relationship. 

d) (U) Conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship 
and scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of 
that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are 
consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their 
business, and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source 
of funds. 

(U) Financial institutions should apply each of the above CDD measures, 
but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis 
depending on the type of customer, business relationship, or transaction. 
The measures that are taken should be consistent with any guidelines 
issued by competent authorities. For higher risk categories, financial 
institutions should perform enhanced due diligence. In certain 
circumstances, where there are low risks, countries may decide that 
financial institutions can apply reduced or simplified measures. 


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(U) Financial institutions should verify the identity of the customer and 
beneficial owner before or during the course of establishing a business 
relationship or conducting transactions for occasional customers. 

Countries may permit financial institutions to complete the verification as 
soon as reasonably practicable following the establishment of the 
relationship, where the money laundering risks are effectively managed 
and where this is essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business. 

(U) Where the financial institution is unable to comply with paragraphs (a) 
to (c) above, it should not open the account, commence business relations, 
or perform the transaction; or should terminate the business relationship; 
and should consider making a suspicious transactions report in relation to 
the customer. 

(U) These requirements should apply to all new customers, though 
financial institutions should also apply this Recommendation to existing 
customers on the basis of materiality and risk, and should conduct due 
diligence on such existing relationships at appropriate times. 

6. {U) In addition to performing normal due diligence measures relative to 
politically exposed persons, financial institutions should: 

a) (U) Have appropriate risk management systems to determine 
whether the customer is a politically exposed person. 

b) (U) Obtain senior management approval for establishing 
business relationships with such customers. 

c) (U) Take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth 
and source of funds. 

d) (U) Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business 
relationship. 

7. (U) In addition to performing normal due-diligence measures relative to 
cross-border correspondent banking and other similar relationships, 
financial institutions should: 

a) (U) Gather sufficient information about a respondent institution 
to understand fully the nature of the respondent’s business and to 
determine from publicly available information the reputation of the 
institution and the quality of supervision, including whether it has 
been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing 
investigation or regulatory action. 

b) (U) Assess the respondent institution’s anti-money laundering 
and terrorist financing controls. 

c) (U) Obtain approval from senior management before 
establishing new correspondent relationships. 

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d) (U) Document the respective responsibilities of each institution. 

e) (XJ) With respect to “payable-through accounts”, be satisfied that 
the respondent bank has verified the identity of and performed on- 
going due diligence on the customers having direct access to 
accounts of the correspondent and that it is able to provide relevant 
customer identification data upon request to the correspondent 
bank. 

8. (U) Financial institutions should pay special attention to any money 
laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies that 
might favor anonymity, and take measures, if needed, to prevent their use 
in money laundering schemes. In particular, financial institutions should 
have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks 
associated with non-face to face business relationships or transactions. 

9. (U) Countries may permit financial institutions to rely on intermediaries 
or other third parties to perform elements (a) - (c) of the CDD process or 
to introduce business, provided that the criteria set out below are met. 
Where such reliance is permitted, the ultimate responsibility for customer 
identification and verification remains with the financial institution relying 
on the third party. 

(U) The criteria that should be met are as follows: 

a) (U) A financial institution relying upon a third party should 
immediately obtain the necessary information concerning elements 
(a) - (c) of the CDD process. Financial institutions should take 
adequate steps to satisfy themselves that copies of identification 
data and other relevant documentation relating to the CDD 
requirements will be made available from the third party upon 
request without delay. 

b) (U) The financial institution should satisfy itself that the third 
party is regulated and supervised for, and has measures in place to 
comply with CDD requirements in line with Recommendations 5 
and 10, 

(U) It is left to each country to determine in which countries the third party 
that meets the conditions can be based, having regard to information 
available on countries that do not or do not adequately apply the FATF 
Recommendations. 

10. (U) Financial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all 
necessary records on transactions, both domestic or international, to 
enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from the 
competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to permit 
reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types 

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of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for 
prosecution of criminal activity. 

(U) Financial institutions should keep records on the identification data 
obtained through the customer due diligence process (e.g. copies or 
records of official identification documents like passports, identity cards, 
driving licenses or similar documents), account files and business 
correspondence for at least five years after the business relationship is 
ended. The identification data and transaction records should be available 
to domestic competent authorities upon appropriate authority. 

11. (U) Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, 
unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which 
have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose. The background and 
purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be examined, the 
findings established in writing, and be available to help competent 
authorities and auditors. 

12. (U) The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set 
out in Recommendations 5, 6, and 8 to 1 1 apply to designated non- 
financial businesses and professions in the following situations: 

a) (U) Casinos - when customers engage in financial transactions 
equal to or above the applicable designated threshold. 

b) (U) Real estate agents - when they are involved in transactions 
for their client concerning the buying and selling of real estate. 

c) (U) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones - 
when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to 
or above the applicable designated threshold. 

d) (U) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and 
accountants when they prepare for or carry out transactions for 
their client concerning the following activities: 

o (U) buying and selling of real estate; 

o (U) managing of client money, securities or other assets; 

o (U) management of bank, savings or securities accounts; 

o (U) organization of contributions for the creation, operation 
or management of companies; 

o (U) creation, operation or management of legal persons or 
arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities. 

e) (U) Trust and company service providers when they prepare for 
or carry out transactions for a client concerning the activities listed 
in the definition in the Glossary. 

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(U) Reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance 

13. (U) If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity; or are related to 
terrorist financing, it should be required, directly by law or regulation, to 
report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU). 

14. (U) Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees 
should be: 

(U) Protected by legal provisions from criminal and civil liability for 
breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract 
or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision, if they report 
their suspicions in good faith to the FIU, even if they did not know 
precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of 
whether illegal activity actually occurred. 

Prohibited by law from disclosing the fact that a suspicious transaction 
report (STR) or related information is being reported to the FIU. 

15. (U) Financial institutions should develop programs against money 
laundering and terrorist financing. These programs should include: 

(U) The development of internal policies, procedures and controls, . 
including appropriate compliance management arrangements, and 
adequate screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring 
employees. 

(U) An ongoing employee training program. 

(U) An audit function to test the system. , 

16. (U) The requirements set out in Recommendations 13 to 15, and 21 
apply to all designated non-financial businesses and professions, subject to 
the following qualifications: 

a) (U) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and 
accountants should be required to report suspicious transactions 
when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a financial 
transaction in relation to the activities described in 
Recommendation 12(d). Countries are strongly encouraged to 
extend the reporting requirement to the rest of the professional 
activities of accountants, including auditing. 

b) (U) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones 
should be required to report suspicious transactions when they 
engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above 
the applicable designated. threshold. 


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c) (U) Trust and company service providers should be required to 
report suspicious transactions for a client when, on behalf of or for 
a client, they engage in a transaction in relation to the activities 
referred to Recommendation 12(e). 

(U) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and 
accountants acting as independent legal professionals, are not required to 
report their suspicions if the relevant information was obtained in 
circumstances where they are subject to professional secrecy or legal 
professional privilege. 

(U) Other measures to deter money laundering and terrorist financing 

17. (U) Countries should ensure that effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, are 
available to deal with natural or legal persons covered by these 
Recommendations that fail to comply with anti-money laundering or 
terrorist financing requirements. 

18. (U) Countries should not approve the establishment or accept the 
continued operation of shell banks. Financial institutions should refuse to 
enter into, or continue, a correspondent banking relationship with shell 
banks. Financial institutions should also guard against establishing 
relations with respondent foreign financial institutions that permit their 
accounts to be used by shell banks. 

19. (U) Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a system 
where banks and other financial institutions and intermediaries would 
report all domestic and international currency transactions above a fixed 
amount, to a national central agency with a computerized data base, 
available to competent authorities for use in money laundering or terrorist 
financing cases, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of the 
information. 

20. (U) Countries should consider applying theFATF Recommendations 
to businesses and professions, other than designated non-financial 
businesses and professions that pose a money laundering or terrorist 
financing risk. 

(U) Countries should further encourage the development of modem and 
secure techniques of money management that are less vulnerable to money 
laundering. 

(U) Measures to be taken with respect to countries that do not or 
insufficiently comply with the FATF Recommendations 

21 . (U) Financial institutions should give special attention to business 
relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and 
financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply 

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the FATF Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no 
apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and 
purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in 
writing, and be available to help competent authorities. Where such a 
country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF 
Recommendations, countries should be able to apply appropriate 
countermeasures. 


22. (U) Financial institutions should ensure that the principles applicable 
to financial institutions, which are mentioned above are also applied to 
branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad, especially in 
countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF 
Recommendations, to the extent that local applicable laws and regulations 
permit. When local applicable laws and regulations prohibit this 
implementation, competent authorities in the country of the parent 
institution should be informed by the financial institutions that they cannot 
apply the FATF Recommendations. 

(U) Regulation and supervision 

23. (U) Countries should ensure that financial institutions are subject to 
adequate regulation and supervision and are effectively implementing the 
FATF Recommendations. Competent authorities should take the necessary 
legal or regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their associates from 
holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling 
interest or holding a management function in a financial institution. 


(U) For financial institutions subject to the Core Principles, the regulatory 
and supervisory measures that apply for prudential purposes and which are 
also relevant to money laundering, should apply in a similar manner for 
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. 


(U) Other financial institutions should be licensed or registered and 
appropriately regulated, and subject to supervision or oversight for anti- 
money laundering purposes, having regard to the risk of money laundering 
or terrorist financing in that sector. At a minimum, businesses providing a 
service of money or value transfer, or of money or currency changing 
should be licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for 
monitoring and ensuring compliance with national requirements to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing. 


24. (U) Designated non-financial businesses and professions should be 
subject to regulatory and supervisory measures as set out below. 


a) (U) Casinos should be subject to a comprehensive 
regulatory and supervisory regime that ensures that they 
have effectively implemented the necessary anti-money 


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laundering and terrorist-financing measures. At a 
minimum: 

o (U) Casinos should be licensed 

o (U) Competent authorities should take the necessary legal 
or regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their 
associates from holding or being the beneficial owner of a 
significant or controlling interest, holding a management 
function in, or being an operator of a casino 

o (U) Competent authorities should ensure that casinos are 
effectively supervised for compliance with requirements to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 

b) (U) Countries should ensure that the other categories of 
designated non-financial businesses and professions are subject to 
effective systems for monitoring and ensuring their compliance 
with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing. This should be performed on a risk-sensitive basis. This 
may be performed by a government authority or by an appropriate 
self-regulatory organization, provided that such an organization 
can ensure that its members comply with their obligations to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 

25. (U) The competent authorities should establish guidelines, and provide 
feedback which will assist financial institutions and designated non- 
financial businesses and professions in applying national measures to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and in particular, in 
detecting and reporting suspicious transactions. 

C. (U) Institutional and Other Measures Necessary in Systems for 
Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 

(U) Competent authorities, their powers and resources 

26. (U) Countries should establish a FIU that serves as a national centre 
for the receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analysis and 
dissemination of STR and other information regarding potential money 
laundering or terrorist financing. The FIU should have access, directly or 
indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law 
enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its 
functions, including the analysis of STR. 

27. (U) Countries should ensure that designated law enforcement 
authorities have responsibility for money laundering and terrorist 
financing investigations. Countries are encouraged to support and develop, 
as far as possible, special investigative techniques suitable for the 
investigation of money laundering, such as controlled delivery, undercover 

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operations and other relevant techniques. Countries are also encouraged to 
use other effective mechanisms such as the use of permanent or temporary 
groups specialized in asset investigation, and co-operative investigations 
with appropriate competent authorities in other countries. 

28. (U) When conducting investigations of money laundering and 
underlying predicate offences, competent authorities should be able to 
obtain documents and information for use in those investigations, and in 
prosecutions and related actions. This should include powers to use 
compulsory measures for the production of records held by financial 
institutions and other persons, for the search of persons and premises, and 
for the seizure and obtaining of evidence. 

29. (U) Supervisors should have adequate powers to monitor and ensure 
compliance by financial institutions with requirements to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing, including the authority to conduct 
inspections. They should be authorized to compel production of any 
information from financial institutions that is relevant to monitoring such 
compliance, and to impose adequate administrative sanctions for failure to 
comply with such requirements. 

30. (U) Countries should provide their competent authorities involved in 
combating money laundering and terrorist financing with adequate 
financial, human and technical resources. Countries should have in place 
processes to ensure that the staff of those authorities are of high integrity. 

31. (U) Countries should ensure that policy makers, the FIU, law 
enforcement and supervisors have effective mechanisms in place which 
enable them to co-operate, and where appropriate coordinate domestically 
with each other concerning the development and implementation of 
policies and activities to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 

32. (U) Countries should ensure that their competent authorities can 
review the effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing systems by maintaining comprehensive statistics on 
matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of such systems. This 
should include statistics on the STR received and disseminated; on money 
laundering and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions and 
convictions; on property frozen, seized and confiscated; and on mutual 
legal assistance or other international requests for co-operation. 

(U) Transparency of legal persons and arrangements 

33. (U) Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of 
legal persons by money launderers. Countries should ensure that there is 
adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and 
control of legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely 

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fashion by competent authorities. In particular, countries that have legal 
persons who are able to issue bearer shares should take appropriate 
measures to ensure that they are not misused for money laundering and be 
able to demonstrate the adequacy of those measures. Countries could 
consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control 
information to financial institutions undertaking the requirements set out 
in Recommendation 5. 

34. (U) Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of 
legal arrangements by money Iaunderers. In particular, countries should 
ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on express 
trusts, including information on the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries that 
can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. 
Countries could consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial 
ownership and control information to financial institutions undertaking the 
requirements set out in Recommendation 5. 

D. (U) International Co-Operation 

35. (U) Countries should take immediate steps to become party to and 
implement fully the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention, and the 
1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism. Countries are also encouraged to ratify and 
implement other relevant international conventions, such as the 1990 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the 2002 Inter-American 
Convention against Terrorism. 

(U) Mutual legal assistance and extradition 

36. (U) Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide 
the widest possible range of mutual legal assistance in relation to money 
laundering and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions, and related 
proceedings. In particular, countries should: 

a) (U) Not prohibit or place unreasonable or unduly restrictive 
conditions on the provision of mutual legal assistance. 

b) (U) Ensure that they have clear and efficient processes for the 
execution of mutual legal assistance requests. 

c) (U) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance 
on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve 
fiscal matters. 

d) (U) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance 
on the grounds that laws require financial institutions to maintain 
secrecy or confidentiality. 

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(U) Countries should ensure that the powers of their competent authorities 
required under Recommendation 28 are also available for use in response 
to requests for mutual legal assistance, and if consistent with their 
domestic framework, in response to direct requests from foreign judicial 
or law enforcement authorities to domestic counterparts. 

(U) To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, consideration should be given to 
devising and applying mechanisms for determining the best venue for 
prosecution of defendants in the interests of justice in cases that are 
subject to prosecution in more than one country. 

37. (U) Countries should, to the greatest extent possible, render mutual 
legal assistance notwithstanding the absence of dual criminality. 

(U) Where dual criminality is required for mutual legal assistance or 
extradition, that requirement should be deemed to be satisfied regardless 
of whether both countries place the offence within the same category of 
offence or denominate the offence by the same terminology, provided that 
both countries criminalize the conduct underlying the offence. 

38. (U) There should be authority to take expeditious action in response to 
requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate 
property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate offences, 
instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of these 
offences, or property of corresponding value. There should also be 
arrangements for coordinating seizure and confiscation proceedings, 
which may include the sharing of confiscated assets. 

39. (U) Countries should recognize money laundering as an extraditable 
offence. Each country should either extradite its own nationals, or where a 
country does not do so solely on the grounds of nationality, that country 
should, at the request of the country seeking extradition, submit the case 
without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution of the offences set forth in the request. Those authorities 
should take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same 
manner as in the case of any other offence of a serious nature under the 
domestic law of that country. The countries concerned should cooperate 
with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to 
ensure the efficiency of such prosecutions. 

(U) Subject to their legal frameworks, countries may consider simplifying 
extradition by allowing direct transmission of extradition requests between 
appropriate ministries, extraditing persons based only on warrants of 
arrests or judgments, and/or introducing a simplified extradition of 
consenting persons who waive formal extradition proceedings. 

(U) Other forms of co-operation 

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40. (U) Countries should ensure that their competent authorities provide 
the widest possible range of international co-operation to their foreign 
counterparts. There should be clear and effective gateways to facilitate the 
prompt and constructive exchange directly between counterparts, either 
spontaneously or upon request, of information relating to both money 
laundering and the underlying predicate offences. Exchanges should be 
permitted without unduly restrictive conditions. In particular: 

a) (U) Competent authorities should not refuse a request for 
assistance on the sole ground that the request is also considered to 
involve fiscal matters. 

b) (U) Countries should not invoke laws that require financial 
institutions to maintain secrecy or confidentiality as a ground for 
refusing to provide co-operation. 

c) (U) Competent authorities should be able to conduct inquiries; 
and where possible, investigations; on behalf of foreign 
counterparts. 

(U) Where the ability to obtain information sought by a foreign competent 
authority is not within the mandate of its counterpart, countries are also 
encouraged to permit a prompt and constructive exchange of information 
with non-counterparts. Co-operation with foreign authorities other than 
counterparts could occur directly or indirectly. When uncertain about the 
appropriate avenue to follow, competent authorities should first contact 
their foreign counterparts for assistance. 

(U) Countries should establish controls and safeguards to ensure that 
information exchanged by competent authorities is used only in an 
authorized manner, consistent with their obligations concerning privacy 
and data protection. 


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(U//FOUO) Appendix C: Memorandum of Understanding 
Among the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, 
and the Postmaster General Regarding Money Laundering 
Investigations 


(U//FOUO) This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) constitutes an 
agreement among the Secretary of the Treasury (the Secretary), the Attorney 
General, and the Postmaster General as to the investigatory authority and 
procedures of Treasury and Justice Bureaus and the Postal Service under 18 
U.S.C sections 1956 and 1957, as amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. 100-690 (Nov. 18, 1988). This replaces a previous MOU on this subject 
between the Secretary and the Attorney General effective May 20, 1987. 

Section I. (U//FOUO) Purpose 

(U//FOUO) The Attorney General, the Secretary and the Postmaster 
General have entered into this MOU in order to encourage effective and 
harmonious cooperation by Treasury and Justice bureaus and the Postal Service in 
the development of cases by bureaus with appropriate experience, to reduce the 
possibility of duplicative investigations, to minimize the potential for dangerous 
situations which might arise from uncoordinated multi-bureau efforts, and to 
enhance the potential for successful prosecution in cases presented to the various 
U.S. Attorneys. 

(U//FOUO) As clearly stated in the legislative history of the Act, this 
MOU does not confer any rights on any third party, including a defendant or other 
party in litigation with the U.S. The fact that a bureau investigates a violation of 
section 1956 or section 1 957 that should have been investigated by another bureau 
under the terms of this MOU, or that any agency not a party to this MOU 
investigates a violation of section 1 956 or section 1957, confers no rights and 
provides no defense to any party, 

(U//FOUO) While this MOU allocates jurisdiction to investigate violations 
of sections 1956 and 1957, nothing in this MOU is intended to augment or 
diminish the investigatory authority of any Justice or Treasury bureau or the 
Postal Service over violations of any federal criminal law, independent of the 
money laundering statute, or to alter the existing allocation or delegation of such 
authority. This MOU governs all investigations involving 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 
1957 and is intended to be used together with MOUs presently existing between 
the bureaus. This MOU does not supersede the provision of 26 U.S.C. 6103 
(confidentiality and disclosure of returns and return information). 

Section II. (U//FOUO) Definitions 

1. (U//FOUO) 'Bureau' includes the Postal Inspection Service. 

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2. (U//FOUO) ‘Treasury bureaus’ mean the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), the U.S. Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(ATF), and the U.S. Secret Service. 

3. (U//FOUO) ‘Justice bureaus’ means the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

4. (U//FOUO) ‘Violations of section 1956’ refers to both civil and 
criminal violations. 

5. (U//FOUO) ‘Specified unlawful activities’ has the definition set forth in 
18 U.S.C. section 1956 (c) (7). 

6. (U//FOUO) ‘Justice Department attorney’ means the appropriate 
Assistant U.S. Attorney or designated Justice Department attorney assigned to the 
prosecution of the case. 

Section III. (U//FOUO) Investigatory Jurisdiction 

(U//FOUO) A bureau's investigatory actions in pursuit of a section 1956 or 
1957 violation shall be conducted only in those areas in which the investigating 
bureau has existing jurisdiction, independent of the money laundering statutes, as 
set forth in this Section. 

A. (U//FOUO) Treasury Bureaus 

1. (U//FOUO) Internal Revenue Service 

(U//FOUO) The Internal Revenue Service will have investigative 
jurisdiction over all violations of Section 1956 and 1957 where the underlying 
conduct is subject to investigation under Title 26 or the BSA. 

2. (U//FOUO) U.S. Customs Service 

a. (U//FOUO) The U.S. Customs Service will have investigatory 
jurisdiction over violations of section 1956 or section 1957 involving the 
following specified unlawful activities: criminal offenses under 18 U.S.C. section 
542, (relating to entry of goods by means of false statements), section 545 
' (relating to the smuggling of goods into the U.S.), section 549 (relating to 
removing goods from Customs custody), section 659 (relating to theft from 
foreign shipment), sections 1461-63 and 1465 (relating to illegal import or export 
of obscene matter), sections 2251-52 (relating to imports or exports of material 
involving sexual exploitation of children), section 2314 (relating to foreign 
transportation of stolen property), and section 2321 (relating to the import or 
export of certain motor vehicles or vehicle parts); 19 U.S.C. section 1590 (relating 
to aviation smuggling); 21 U.S.C. section 857 (relating to the illegal import or 
export of drug paraphernalia); criminal offenses under section 11 of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. section 2410); criminal offenses 
under section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1705); criminal offenses under section 16 of the Trading with the Enemy 

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Act (50 U.S.C. App. 16); and criminal offenses under section 38(c) of the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. section 2778) (relating to exportation, in transit, 
temporary import, or temporary export transactions). 

b. (U//FOUO) The U.S. Customs Service will have investigatory 
jurisdiction over violations of section 1956(a) (2) (B)(ii), involving the 
international transportation of monetary instruments or funds which are proceeds 
of some form of unlawful activity and where the defendant knew that the 
transportation was designed in whole or in part to avoid a transaction reporting 
requirement under 31 U.S.C. 5316 (Reports on exporting and importing monetary 
instruments). 

3. (U//FOUO) U.S. Secret Service 

(U//FOUO) The U.S. Secret Service will have investigatory jurisdiction 
over violations of section 1956 or section 1957 involving the SUA of an offense 
under 18 U.S.C. sections 471-473 (counterfeiting of obligations or securities of 
the United States), sections 500-503 (counterfeiting of blank or postal money 
orders, postage stamps, foreign governments postage and revenue stamps, and 
postmarking stamps), section 657 (involving theft, embezzlement or 
misapplication by employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company [FDIC]), 
and section 1029 (fraud and related activity in connection with access devices). 

4. (U//FOUO) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

(U//FOUO) The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms will have 
investigatory jurisdiction over violations of section 1956 or section 1957 
involving the SUA of an offense under 18 U.S.C. sections 2341 -2346 (trafficking 
in contraband cigarettes); section 38(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C 
section 2778 (relating to the importation of items on the U.S. Munitions Import 
List, except those relating to exportation, in transit, temporary import, or 
temporary export transactions); and 18 U.S.C. 1952 (relating to traveling in 
interstate commerce, with respect to liquor on which federal excise tax has not 
been paid and arson); or any act or activity constituting an offense listed in 18 
U.S.C. 1961(1), with respect to any act or threat involving arson, which is 
chargeable under State law and punishable for more than one year. 

B. (U//FOUO) Justice Bureaus 

1. (U//FOUO) Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(U//FOUO) The Federal Bureau of Investigation will have investigatory 
jurisdiction over violations of section 1956 or section 1957 involving unlawful 
activities of an offense under 18 U.S.C. section 152 (relating to concealment of 
assets; false oaths and claims; bribery), section 215 (relating to commissions or 
gifts for procuring loans), section 513 (relating to securities of States and private 
entities), section 641 (relating to public money, property, or records), section 656 
(relating to theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by bank officer or employee), 

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section 657 (relating to lending, credit, and insurance institutions), 658 (relating to 
property mortgaged or pledged to farm credit agencies), section 666 (relating to 
theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds), sections 793,. 794, 
or 798 (relating to espionage), section 875 (relating to interstate communications), 
section 1201 (relating to kidnapping), section 1203 (relating to hostage taking), 
section 1344 (relating to bank fraud), or section 21 13 or 21 14 (relating to bank 
and postal robbery and theft), sections 2251, 2251 A, 2252, and 2258 (relating to 
sexual exploitation of children); section 2319 (relating to copyright infringement); 
or section 2320 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit goods and services); or 7 
U.S.C. section 2024 (relating to food stamp fraud); 21 U.S.C. section 830 
(relating to precursor chemicals), section 857 (relating to transportation of drug 
paraphernalia) and, with respect to a financial transaction occurring in whole or in 
part in the U.S., an offense against a foreign nation involving the manufacture, 
importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as such term is defined 
for the purposes of the Controlled Substances Act); and any act or acts 
constituting a continuing criminal enterprise, as that term is defined in section 408 
of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848); or any act or activity 
constituting an offense listed in 18 U.S.C. 1961(1), with respect to any act or 
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, 
dealing in obscene matter, or in dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs 
which is chargeable under State law and punishable for more than one year; 1 8 
U.S.C. 201 (bribery); 18 U.S.C. 224 (sports bribery); 18 U.S.C. 659 (theft from 
interstate shipment); 18 U.S.C. 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare 
funds); 18 U.S.C. 891-894 (extortionate credit transactions); 18 U.S.C. 1029 
(fraud and related activity in connection with access devices); 18 U.S.C. 1084 (the 
transmission of gambling information); 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. 
1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. 1461-1465 (obscene matter); 18 U.S.C. 1503 
(obstruction of justice); 18 U.S.C. 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigation); 18 
U.S.C. 1511 (the obstruction of State or local law enforcement); 18U.S.C. 1512 
(tampering with a witness, victim or informant); 18 U.S.C. 1513 (retaliating 
against a witness, victim or informant); 18 U.S.C. 1951 (interference with 
commerce, robbery or extortion); 18 U.S.C. 1952 (racketeering, except with 
respect to untaxed paid liquor and arson); 18 U.S.C. 1953 (interstate 
transportation of wagering paraphernalia); 18 U.S.C. 1954 (unlawful welfare fund 
payments); 18 U.S.C. 1955 (the prohibition ofillegal gambling businesses); 18 
U.S.C. 1958 (use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder- 
for-hire); 18 U.S.C. 2251, 2251 A, 2252, and 2258 (sexual exploitation of 
children); 18 U.S.C. 2321 (trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle 
parts); 18 U.S.C. 2312 and 2313 (interstate transportation of stolen motor 
vehicles); 18 U.S.C. 2314 and 2315 (interstate transportation of stolen property); 
18 U.S.C. 2421-24 (white slave traffic); any act which is indictable under 29 
U.S.C. 186 (restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or 29 
U.S.C. 501(c) (embezzlement from union funds); any offense involving fraud 
connected with a case under title 1 1, fraud in the sale of securities, and the 

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felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or 
otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law 
of the U.S." 

(U//FOUO) (The above SUAs in Section 1956 and violations specified in 
Section 1961 are changed occasionally, [for current RICO predicate offenses], 
272-4, and 272-1 1 [for current SUAs].) 

2. (U//FOUO) Dmg Enforcement Administration 

(U//FOUO) The Drug Enforcement Administration shall have 
investigatory jurisdiction over violations of sections 1956 or 1957 involving the 
specified unlawful activities of, with respect to a financial transaction occurring in 
whole or in part in the U.S., an offense against a foreign nation involving the 
manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as such 
term is defined for the purpose of the Controlled Substances Act) including 21 
U.S.C. 830 (relating to precursor and essential chemicals) and 857 (relating to 
transportation of drug paraphernalia); or any act or acts constituting a continuing ■ 
criminal enterprise, as that term is defined in section 408 of the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848); or any of the predicate offenses enumerated in 
18 U.S.C. 1961(1) dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drags which are 
chargeable under State law and punishable for more than one year, or the 
felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or 
otherwise dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law 
of the U.S. 

C. (U//FOUO) U.S. Postal Service 

(U//FOUO) The investigative jurisdiction of the Postal Inspection Service 
is limited by 18 U.S.C. 3061 to offenses regarding property in the custody of the 
Postal Service, property of the Postal Service, use of the mails, other postal 
offenses, and offenses for which the Postal Service has been delegated ‘ 
investigative authority pursuant to 1 8 U.S.C. 3061 (b)(2). Subject to these 
limitations, the Postal Inspection Service shall have investigative jurisdiction over 
violations of sections 1956 and 1957 involving the specified unlawful activities of 
18 U.S.C. 201 (bribery of public officials and witnesses); 18 U.S.C. 500-503 
(counterfeiting of money orders, post cards, indicia of postage and postmarking 
stamps); 18 U.S.C. 641 (theft of public money, property or records); 18 U.S.C. 
1029 (fraudulent activity in connection with access devices) with respect to 
violations involving postal employees, fraud against the Postal Service or where 
the primary focus of the offense is mail fraud or a violation of 1 8 U.S.C. 21 14 
(postal robbery); 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. 1343 (wire fraud) where 
the primary focus of the offense is mail fraud; 1 8 U.S.C. 1461 and 1463 (mailing 
of obscene matter); 18 U.S.C. 1503, 1510-1513 (obstruction of justice); 18 U.S.C. 
1952 (mailing in aid of racketeering enterprises); 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1)(A) 

(organized crime); 18 U.S.C. 2114 (robbery of mail, other property); 18 U.S.C. 
2251, 2252 (sexual exploitation of minors); any 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1) offense 

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dealing in narcotics and other dangerous drugs which are chargeable under state 
law and punishable for more than one year, or by the felonious manufacture, 
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in 
narcotics or other dangerous drugs punishable under any law of the U.S., or any 
act or acts constituting criminal enterprise, as that term is defined in section 408 
of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848); 21 U.S.C. 843 (b) (use of mails 
to violate Controlled Substances Act); and, Section 1 822 of the Mail Order Drug 
Paraphernalia Control Act (21 U.S.C. 857) (transportation of drug paraphernalia. 

Section IV. (U//FOUO) Undercover Operations ’ 

(U//FOUO) This MOU will govern the conduct of all money laundering 
investigations under sections 1956 and 1957 in that all parties hereto agree that all 
undercover operations will be reviewed using each bureau's internal guidelines, 
the objectives of which are consistent with existing Attorney General Guidelines 
on undercover operations. 

Section V. (U//FOUO) Seizure and Forfeiture 

(U//FOUO) Any property involved in a violation of section 1 956 or 1957 
that a Treasury or Justice bureau or the Postal Service has authority to investigate 
under Section III of this MOU may be seized by that bureau or the Postal Service, 
if that property is subject to forfeiture to the U.S. under 1 8 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(A) or 
981(a)(1)(B). 

(U//FOUO) Where a Treasury or Justice bureau or the Postal Service 
would have authority to seize property under the authority stated in the preceding 
paragraph is not present to make the seizure, any Treasury or Justice bureau or the 
Postal Service that is present may seize the property and shall immediately turn 
over that property to the bureau having Section III investigatory jurisdiction, 
where the forfeiture processing shall occur. 

(U//FOUO) Any property seized under this Section shall, upon forfeiture 
under 18 U.S.C. 981 or 982, be apportioned among the appropriate Treasury or 
Justice bureaus or the Postal Service in accordance with their respective 
contribution to the overall efforts expended in the investigation, seizure, or 
forfeiture. 

(U//FOUO) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 981(e) and, where appropriate, the 
Justice Department, the Treasury Department or the Postal Service forfeiture 
guidelines, apportionment may include equitable transfers to any other Federal 
agency or State or local authorities, which participated directly in any of the acts 
which led to the seizure or forfeiture. 

(U//FOUO) Any dispute regarding the seizure, forfeiture, apportionment, 
or disposition of property under this section shall be governed by the disputes 
resolution procedure in Section IX of this MOU. 


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(U//FOUO) This MOU does not affect Treasury or Justice bureaus’ or the 
Postal Service’s authority to seize property or the disposition of such property 
under statutory seizure and forfeiture provisions not based on section 1 956 and 
1957 violations. 

A. (U//FOUO) Seizure of Attorney Fees: 

(U//FOUO) Treasury and Justice bureaus and the Postal Service will 
follow DOJ guidelines in reference to the seizure and forfeiture of any money or 
property that is held by an attorney or payment for the defense of a client. See U.S. 
Attorneys Manual 9-1 1 1.000, et seq. 

Section VI. (U//FOUO) Prosecution 

(U//FOUO) A bureau that conducts an investigation under the authority of 
tills MOU shall coordinate with Justice Department attorneys. 

Section VH. (U//FOUO) Notice, Coordination, and Lead Bureau 

A. (U//FOUO) Notice 

1. (U//FOUO) If, during the investigation of a section 1956 or 1957 
violation, a bureau discovers an SUA or a transaction reporting violation over 
which another bureau has investigatory jurisdiction, that bureau shall give notice 
to the bureau which has investigatory jurisdiction over the SUA or to the Internal 
Revenue Service or Customs, as appropriate, in the case of a transaction reporting 
violation, and to consult prior to taking any investigative actions impacting on the 
other bureau's jurisdiction. 

2. (U//FOUO) If a bureau discovers transactions involving the proceeds of 
an SUA conducted with intent to engage in a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, that bureau shall give notice to the Internal Revenue 
Service and coordinate the subsequent investigation with the IRS. To the extent 
that any IRS money laundering investigation requires the acquisition of evidence 
concerning an underlying SUA, the IRS shall notify the bureau having jurisdiction 
over the SUA and coordinate the subsequent investigation with that bureau. 

3. (U//FOUO) Notice under this section will ordinarily be made at' 
supervisory field level and will, at a minimum, require a complete summary of the 
facts and circumstances of the investigation. 

(U//FOUO) However, in those instances where a bureau undertakes an 
investigation in which it determines that field level disclosure would be 
detrimental to the investigation, the required notice will be made at the 
headquarters level and dissemination restricted to selected individuals consistent 
with the need to maintain security of the investigations. 

B. (U//FOUO) Coordination and Determination of Lead Bureau 

(U//FOUO) Investigatory actions which involve areas outside the 
investigating bureau's existing jurisdiction, independent of the money laundering 

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statute, shall be conducted only in coordination with the bureau(s) which do have 
existing jurisdiction independent of the money laundering statute. Coordination 
requires, at a minimum, a determination of the degree of cooperation necessary 
between the coordinating bureau(s) and includes continuing dialogue as the case 
develops. At the request of any coordinating bureau, at any time as the case 
develops, there shall be a determination of the lead bureau for the Section 1956 or 
1957 investigation. The determination of lead bureau does not preclude a 
subsequent request by a coordinating bureau for redetermination of the lead as 
compelling facts and circumstances warrant. 

(U//FOUO) The determination of the lead bureau will be made at the 
supervisory field level by the bureaus involved and will be governed by which 
bureau has the paramount investigatory interest. In determining which bureau has 
the paramount investigatory interest, the factors to be considered shall include, 
but not be limited to: 

• (U//FOUO) Likely impact on major criminal enterprises 

• (U//FOUO) Likelihood of successful prosecution 

• (U//FOUO) Existence of an SUA, as defined in section 1956(c)(7) 

• (U//FOUO) Jeopardy to informants, undercover agents, or third parties 

• (U//FOUO) Commitment of investigatory resources 

• (U//FOUO) Any other matter of substantive investigative interest. 

Section VIII. (U//FOUO) Jointly Conducted Investigations 

(U//FOUO) Treasury and Justice bureaus and the Postal Service are 
encouraged to enter into joint investigatory endeavors in circumstances that may 
necessitate or justify the use of skills and resources of more than one bureau. The 
specific details of each joint investigation, including the role of each bureau in the 
endeavor, will be formulated at the onset of the investigation and will be provided 
to each bureau's headquarters by each bureau’s established procedures. While 
differing circumstances will result in varied arrangements from project to project, 
certain conditions will always apply: 

• (U//FOUO) Participating personnel will be supervised by their respective 
bureaus. This does not alter any other concerning supervision of investigatory 
personnel 

(U//FOUO) Money Laundering Manual 

• (U//FOUO) Only one evidentiary document, such as a record of 
interview will be prepared, and a copy will be furnished to the other bureau at the 
time the document is prepared 


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♦ (U//FOUO) Resources and investigatory expertise will be provided to the 
requesting bureau when the investigatory matter meets the criteria of the 
requested bureau and when available resources allow 

• (U//FOUO) Any contact with the news media, such as press releases, 
will be coordinated and agreed to in advance by the bureaus involved 

Section IX. (U//FOUO) Dispute Resolution 

(U//FOUO) The Secretary, the Attorney General and the Postmaster 
General contemplate that in cases of overlapping jurisdiction, the appropriate 
bureaus will work in concert to the extent authorized by law. Any disputes 
between bureaus should be resolved at the field level. When this cannot be 
accomplished, the matter will be referred to the respective headquarters' point of 
contact. In the event that disputes cannot be resolved by the bureau headquarters, 
the matter will be expeditiously referred to the Assistant Attorney General, 
Criminal Division, DOJ, and the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Department 
of the Treasury, and in disputes involving the Postal Service, to the Chief Postal 
Inspector, whose decisions shall be final. 

Section X. (U//FOUO) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 

(U//FOUO) Treasury and Justice bureaus and the Postal Service must 
immediately notify the appropriate prosecuting attorney or other designated DOJ 
official if, in the course of a section 1956 or section 1957 investigation, it 
becomes likely that extraterritorial jurisdiction under section 1956(f) or section 
1957(d) will be invoked. See U.S. Attorneys Manual 9-105. 100. 

Section XI. (U//FOUO) Amendment 

(U//FOUO) This MOU may be amended by deletion or modification of 
any provision contained herein, or by addition of new provisions, after written 
concurrence of all the parties to the MOU. 

(U//FOUO) Section XII. Termination 

(U//FOUO) This MOU will remain in effect until terminated by the 
Attorney General or the Secretary or the Postmaster General upon 30 days' 
written notice. 

Section XIII. (U//FOUO) Approval 

(U//FOUO) This MOU becomes effective when approved by the parties 
identified below. 

ptfcl 1C, A Ijvfrty {Million* p, 

Peter K. Nunez William P. Barr 

Assistant Secretary (Enforcement) Deputy Attorney General U.S. 

Department of Treasury U.S. DOJ 

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MU II IMP 2/llM 

Date Date 

Charles R. Clauson 
Chief Postal Inspector 

2/I6/3O 

Date 


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(U) Appendix D; Sources of Additional Information 

(TJ) FBI Intranet Resources: 

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(U) DOJ Intranet Resourcesj | 

(U) External Web (Internet) Resources: . 

http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/economic_issues/terrorist_financing/money_ 

laundering/money_reading.html - Department of State; for additional information on 
money laundering 

(U) http://www.egmontgroup.org - Egmont Group; for additional information regarding 
the Egmont group and law enforcement requests 

(U) www.fincen.gov/hr3162.pdf - FinCEN; for additional information on money 
laundering 

(U) www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/pdf/ - Department of the Treasury; for a full copy 
of the U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment 

(U) http://www.fatf-gafi.org - FATF; for additional information regarding the FATF and 
recent money laundering assessments 

(U) http://www.state.gov, www.treas.gov, www.cdi.gov - Various; for information on 
Designated Terrorist Lists 


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(U) Appendix E: Contact Information 


Criminal Investigative Division 


AD Kevin L. Perkins 

202-324-4260 

Deputy Assistant Director David A. Cardona 

202-324-5740 

Financial Crimes Section 


Section Chief Sharon E. Ormsby 



Asset Forfeiture/Money Laundering Unit 


Unit Chief 



— 


AF/MLU Address: 

FBI Headquarters, Room 3901 
J. Edgar Hoover Building 
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20535 


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(U) Appendix F: Key Words 

(U) 111 - FBI investigative classification for money laundering matters, subclassified 
A-F. 

(U) a.k.a. - also known as. 

(U) Black market peso exchange - a type of informal value transfer system typically 
used in the Colombian drug trade. Funds can be transferred through this system with the 
assistance of black market currency brokers and their agents in various countries. 

(U) Bulk cash smuggling - the process of physically transporting currency or monetary 
instruments, such as traveler’s or cashier’s checks, across national borders. 

(U) Cap - a maximum amount or number. 

(U) Casas de Cambio - currency exchange houses specializing in Latin American 
currencies and transactions. These businesses provide various money services to 
customers and are common along the U.S./Mexican border. 

(U) Closed system - a type of stored value or prepaid card that can be used for limited 
purposes. Closed system cards typically can be used only to purchase products or services 
from a specific merchant and cannot be used for ATM withdraws. 

(U) Cooling-off period - the time period following the purchase of a life insurance 
contract during which the contract can be cancelled without penalty. 

(U) Correspondent account - accounts held by U.S. banks on behalf of foreign banks. 
Such accounts allow foreign banks to clear U.S. dollar transactions. 

(U) Criminally derived property - any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds 
obtained from a criminal offense. 

(U) Dependent/parallel transactions - transactions defined in the USA PATRIOT Act 
as they pertain to money remitter businesses. Such transactions include those that are 
connected to, or associated with, other transactions involving the transfer or transmission 
of illegal proceeds. 

(U) Digital currency - also known as e-currency, digital currency is a cyber-based means 
of exchange typically backed by gold, silver, or other precious metals. Digital currencies 
are unique to their issuers and can only be used to purchase products and services from 
vendors who accept the issuer’s specific form of currency. 

(U) Due diligence - appropriate action or appropriate time given. 

(U) Egmont - an international network of more than 100 countries that have 
implemented national centers to collect, analyze, and disseminate information on 
suspicious or unusual financial activity from the financial industry. 

(U) Et seq. - abbreviation for the Latin phrase et sequentes, meaning "and the following." 
It is commonly used by lawyers to include numbered lists, pages, or sections after the 
first number is stated. 

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(U) Facilitation cases - cases where the FBI receives proceeds derived from one or more 
of the specified unlawful activities (18 U.S.C. §1 956(c) (7)), then places the money into 
the financial system or converts it in some way to launder it toward the criminal 
organization. 

(U) Financial Action Task Force - an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the 
development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing. 

(U) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network - Bureau of the Department of the 
Treasury whose mission is to safeguard the financial system from the abuses of financial 
crime, including terrorist financing, money laundering, and other illicit activity. 

(U) Financial transaction -1) a transaction that in any way or degree affects interstate or 
foreign commerce: a) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means, 
b) involving one or more monetary instruments, or c) involving the transfer of title to any 
real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft. 2) a transaction involving the use of a financial 
institution that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign 
commerce in any way or degree. 

(U) Gift cards - prepaid cards that can be purchased anonymously through retail outlets 
and are given to others. 

(V) Giros - a currency exchange house specializing in Latin American currencies and 
transactions. These businesses provide various money services to customers and are 
common along the U.SVMexican border. 

(V) Hawala - an informal mechanism of transferring money offshore without the 
physical movement of currency. Hawala transactions are often conducted using 
telephones and code words. 

(U) Hawaladar - the coordinator and manager of a Hawala business. 

(U) Informal value transfer systems - mechanisms used to transfer hinds from one 
location to another without the use of traditional or formal banking channels. 

(U) In rem - against the property. 

(U) Interbank (correspondent account) - accounts held by U.S. banks on behalf of 
foreign banks. Such accounts allow foreign banks to clear U.S. dollar transactions. 

(U)Integration - the third stage of the money laundering process; the use of laundered 
proceeds to purchase products and services in mainstream commerce. 

(U) Layering - the second stage of the money laundering process; the separation of 
illegal proceeds from their original sources by conducting a series of financial 
transactions. 

(U) Legat - Legal attache. A representative of the FBI in a foreign jurisdiction. 


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(U) Loan-back schemes - schemes that involve illegal deposits at financial institutions 
where the criminal receives a "loan" from the bank, trust, corporation, or fiduciary. The 
loan is actually the criminal’s own illegally derived money. 

(U) Monetary transaction - the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument by, through, 
or to a financial institution, but such term does not include any transaction necessary to 
preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution. 

(U) Money laundering - the process by which criminals conceal or disguise their 
illegally derived proceeds, typically for the purpose of promoting or facilitating future 
criminal activity, disguising the origin of the proceeds, evading taxes, or avoiding 
reporting requirements. 

(U) Money services businesses - nonbank financial institutions that provide an array of 
financial services without the need for customer accounts. Such services include money 
transfers, check cashing, foreign currency exchange, and the issuance of money orders 
and traveler’s checks. 

(U) Nexus - a causal link. 

(U) One-off - a one-time event. 

(U) Open system - a type of stored value or prepaid card that does not limit use to a 
particular merchant or type of product or service. Such card types often have "reload" 
features and can be used to withdraw funds from ATMs worldwide. 

(U) Placement - the first stage of the money laundering process; the initial use of 
illegally derived proceeds. 

(U) Predicate offenses - Unlawful activities. 

(U) Prepaid debit card - a card that is funded in advance, typically through a connection 
with a bank account, and can be used for the purchase of products and services, to 
withdraw funds at various locations via ATMs or to transfer funds to other card holders. 

(U) Sensitive circumstance - circumstances that may exist in an undercover operation 
that would require Group I authority as per the Attorney General's Guidelines and the 
Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive Operations. 

(U) Shell/Shelf company - a company that exists only on paper and has no real operating 
business or physical location. 

(U) Smart cards - prepaid cards that keep track of balances directly on the card through 
computer chips or other technology. 

(U) Smurf - an individual recruited to assist in the money laundering process by 
conducting a series of structured financial transactions on behalf of the launderer, at one 
or more financial institutions, and in amounts below the $10,000 reporting threshold. 

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(U) Smurfing - the process of engaging in a series of structured financial transactions on 
behalf of a money launderer, at one or more financial institutions, and in amounts below 
the $10,000 reporting threshold. 

(U) Specific unlawful activity - specific criminal acts listed in the U.S. money 
laundering statutes as predicate offenses for which the crime of money laundering can be 
charged. 

(U) Sting - an undercover operation. 

(U) Stored value cards - cards that can be purchased and funded in advance of their use. 
Stored value cards come in many forms to include cards that store balances on the cards 
themselves and those linked to financial accounts. 

(U) Structuring - financial transactions conducted below the BSA reporting threshold 
for the sole purpose of evading reporting requirements. 

(U) Title HI - the title of the Federal Criminal Code that sets forth the terms, conditions, 
and authorities for using “bugs” or other listening devices by law enforcement in criminal 
investigations. 


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(U) Appendix G: Acronyms 



Automated Case Support 


Assistant Director 


Assistant Director in Charge 


Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section 


Attorney General 


Attorney General's Guidelines 


Attorney General’s General Crime Guidelines 


Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations 


Attorney General's Guidelines for Extraterritorial FBI 
Operations and Criminal Investigations 


Anti-Money Laundering 


Assistant Special Agent in Charge 


American Telephone and Telegraph 


Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 


Automated Teller Machines 


Assistant United States Attorney 


Bank Secrecy Act 


Black Market Peso Exchange 


Customer Due Diligence 


Currency Exchangers 


Confidential Informant 


Currency Exchange Brokers 



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cm 

Criminal Investigative Division 

CM®. 

Currency or Monetary Instrument Report 

CPOT 

Consolidated Priority Organization Targets 

CTR 

Currency Transactions Reports 

CTRC 

Currency Transactions Reports by Casino 

CUORC 

Criminal Undercover Operations Review Committee 

.CHS 

Confidential Human Source 

DEA 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

DEP 

Designation of Exempt Person 

DIOG 

Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 

DOJ 

Department of Justice 

DTO 

Designated Terrorist Organization 

EC 

Electronic Communication 

EPA. 

Environmental Protection Agency 

FATF 

Financial Action Task Force 

FBAR 

Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts Report 

FBI 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FBIHQ 

Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters 

FCS 

Financial Crimes Section 

FDIC 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

FGUSO 

Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive Operations 

FinCEN 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

FIU 

Financial Intelligence Unit 


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FTO 

Foreign Terrorist Organizations 

G/CEP 

Gangs and Criminal Enterprise Program 

ICE 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IDW 

Investigative Data Warehouse ' 

IRS 

Internal Revenue Service 

ITAR 

Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering 

rvrs 

Informal Value Transfer Systems 

LEA 

Law Enforcement Agency 

MAOP 

Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures 

MIOG 

Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines 

ML 

Money Laundering 

MLAT 

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 

MOU 

Memorandum of Understanding 

MSB 

Money Services Business 

OC 

Organized Crime 

OF AC 

Office ofForeign Assets Control 

OLA 

Office of International Affairs, DOJ 

PDC 

Prepaid Debit Cards y 

RICO 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 

RMSB 

Registration of Money Services Business 

SA 

Special Agent 

SAC 

Special Agent in Charge 

SAR 

Suspicious Activity Report 


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SARC 

Suspicious Activity Report by Casinos and Card Clubs 

SARI 

Suspicious Activity Report by Insurance Companies 

SARM 

Suspicious Activity Report by Money Services Businesses 

SARSF 

Suspicious Activity Report by the Security and Futures 
Industries 

SOD 

Special Operations Division 

STR 

Suspicious Transaction Report 

SUA 

Specified Unlawful Activity 

SVC 

Stored Value Cards 

TFOS 

Terrorist Financing Operations Section 

u.s. 

United States 

UCE 

Undercover Employee 

uco 

Undercover Operation 

USA 

United States Attorney 

USA PATRIOT Act 

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. 

USAO 

United States Attorney’s Office 

U.S.C. 

United States Code 

uses 

United States Customs Service 

usou 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit 

USPER 

United States Person; US Person; U.S. Person; USP; USPs; 
USPERs 

USPS 

United States Postal Service 

USSS 

United States Secret Service 


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USUA 

Unknown Specified Unlawful Activity 

VCMO 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders 

WCC 

White Collar Crime 

WebCBRS 

Web Currency and Banking Retrieval System 


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